1. International Security and Peace Clausewitzian Theory of War: Part II Prof. Jaechun Kim

2.  Clausewitz continued…  War is violent in nature ! This has to do with his early combat experiences… This has to do with his early combat experiences…  Destruction of enemy as the key to the victory “Kind-hearted people might think that there is some ingenious way to disarm to defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed and might imagine this is the true gold of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, this is a fallacy that must be exposed. War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.” “Kind-hearted people might think that there is some ingenious way to disarm to defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed and might imagine this is the true gold of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, this is a fallacy that must be exposed. War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.”

3.  The surest way of way of winning war is using all possible force and to destroy enemies…  War serves the end of politics by a complete defeat of the enemy?? Wars must be waged with extreme violence regardless of their political purposes??   Clausewitzian contradiction… ??  Centers of gravity Where all power and movement of enemies are concentrated Where all power and movement of enemies are concentrated “The hub of all power and movement on which everything depends.” “The hub of all power and movement on which everything depends.” Destroy the enemy’s center of gravity! Destroy the enemy’s center of gravity!

4.  Violence is the essence of war, destruction of enemy is key to the victory…   War as “politics by other means”  Sun Tzu (  Sun Tzu ( 孫子 )  Sun Tzu’s teaching is different on this aspect of Clausewitz  The Art of War in 450 B.C.  During the period of “Warring States”  War can be won without fighting rather than bloodshed…  Break the enemy’s will to fight…

5. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz Sun Tzu and Clausewitz  Bloodless victory possible  Strategic Maneuver (deception & surprise) (deception & surprise)  “best commander is the  “best commander is the one who does not have one who does not have to fight” to fight”  Find the weak points of the enemies and exploit them…  Role of Intelligence  Violence is essence  Decisive Battle (superior military force) (superior military force)  Find the “Centers of Gravity” (“the hub of all power and (“the hub of all power and movement on which movement on which everything depends.”) everything depends.”)

6.  Sun Tzu – break enemy’s will to fight…  In case of fighting, strategic maneuver…!  Clausewitz – penetrate the enemy’s line of defense, destruct the enemy C – Diversions can be dangerous…. Concentrate on key considerations… C – Diversions can be dangerous…. Concentrate on key considerations…  Sun Tzu – proper and accurate intelligence is critical…!  Clausewitz – intelligence is unreliable…  Culminating Point of Victory (or Attack) The point where the attacker’s strength is sapped and his superiority is exhausted… The point where the attacker’s strength is sapped and his superiority is exhausted… “ It is not possible in every war for the victor to overthrow his enemy completely. Victory has a culminating point …” “ It is not possible in every war for the victor to overthrow his enemy completely. Victory has a culminating point …”

7.  Things Clausewitz overlooked…  Sea Power Strategy was concerned with the movements of armies only. Oceans were beyond his intellectual horizons… Strategy was concerned with the movements of armies only. Oceans were beyond his intellectual horizons…  Economic Factors Economic power is an important asset in war…. Economic power is an important asset in war…. The US vs. Japan during the WWII…. The US vs. Japan during the WWII….  Importance of Strategic Maneuver (cf. Sun Tzu)  Technological Factors  Defense is always easier because it’s easier to control friction when you defend… Not always the case… Not always the case…  Ethical Consideration of War… On War is not a book about the causes of war or moral aspects of war… On War is not a book about the causes of war or moral aspects of war…

8.  Civil Military relations War is continuation of politics by other means  military means should be subordinated to the political ends  civilian control over military affairs… War is continuation of politics by other means  military means should be subordinated to the political ends  civilian control over military affairs… “ If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war … the only sound expedient is to make the commander in chief a member of the cabinet. ” It is the responsibility of the political leaders, not the military leaders, to correctly “establish the kind of war on which they are embarking” and not to lose sight of the objective of war… It is the responsibility of the political leaders, not the military leaders, to correctly “establish the kind of war on which they are embarking” and not to lose sight of the objective of war… Politicians must not attempt to use the instrument of war to achieve other parochial interests (Diversionary War) Politicians must not attempt to use the instrument of war to achieve other parochial interests (Diversionary War) They should garner respect from the military… They should garner respect from the military…

9.  Civil-military problematique  1 st principle: Military must be strong enough to prevail in wars to protect society from its enemies  2 nd: Military should not be too strong to meddle into domestic affairs and destruct society it is intended to protect  The need to have protection by the military and the need to have protection from the military are in tension because efforts to assure one side complicate efforts to assure the other…

10.  Three types of Civil Military Relations by Paul Bracken C<M ; military dictatorship C>M ; liberal democracy Praetorian state - Military is the only administratively competent institution..  Harold Lasswell – Garrison State  S. P. Huntington – Soldier and State (1957)  Professionalization You have to respect independent military sphere of action (autonomy). You have to respect independent military sphere of action (autonomy). This will lead to professionalization of military. And this in turn will lead to political neutrality and voluntary subordination. This will lead to professionalization of military. And this in turn will lead to political neutrality and voluntary subordination.

11.  Civil Military Conflict during the Korean War  H. Truman vs. D. MacArthur  Son to Arthur MacArthur  Graduate of the West Point  During the Korean War, the commander of the UNF

12.  After China’s human sea wave tactics, Mac regarded  Inchon Landing Memorial  Chinese offensive as the declaration of war against the West. But T didn’t want to expand the war on Korean peninsula.

13.  MacArthur to US News and World Report - “limitations imposed on me by the denial of the options of unlimited pursuit and unlimited attack on Communist China was an enormous handicap, without precedent in military history…”  T wanting to fire Mac…  T working on peace term with China, but M challenges T and China… M saying that he can use Chiang’s force to invade mainland China…  Mac’ visit to Formosa island right after the outbreak of the Korean war…

14.  Joint Session of Congress “When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the Plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. many times since I took the oath on the Plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day, which proclaimed, most barrack ballads of that day, which proclaimed, most proudly, that ‘Old soldiers never die. They just fade away.’ proudly, that ‘Old soldiers never die. They just fade away.’ And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away – an old soldier who military career and just fade away – an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.” duty.”

15.  Inchon Jayu Park

16.  Military officers do not like being told that the military aim must be subordinated to the political objectives… They feel interference from politicians is detrimental to the art of warfare…

17.   Mac believed that military affair has its own logic…   Mac said: “ A theater commander is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands the whole area, politically, economically, and militarily. At that state of the game when politics fails and the military takes over, you must trust the military... when men become locked in battle, there should be no artifice under the name of politics which should handicap your own men, decrease their chances for winning, and increase their losses. ”

18. GoalMeansExamples Absolute War (Abstraction) To eliminate opponent’s political independen ce Full mobilization of national resources; Break the will of opponent and defeat the army -WWI, WWII (?)  Total war, All-out war(Means) Limited War To create favorable peace terms (concession s) Partial mobilization of national resources; Bend the will of opponent and defeat the army -Gulf War (for the US not for the Iraqis), -Falklands War People’s War “broadening and intensification of the fermentation process known as war” Bend the will, Not necessarily by defeating the military, But by fostering and exploiting a broad base of popular support.. Not necessarily attacking military forces of the enemies… Sun Tzu!! -Mao’s communist revolution in China, -Terrorism(?)

19.  Clausewitzian Contradiction?  Violence is the essence of war; Destruction of enemy is the key to the victory   War is continuation of politics by other means.  Liddle Hart argued: “He was the source of the doctrine of absolute war, the fight to a finish theory which, beginning with the argument that war is only a continuation of state policy by other means, ended by making policy the slave of strategy … C looked only to the end of war, not beyond war to the subsequent peace.”  In the latter half of the 19 th century and early half of the 20 th century  emphasis on moral forces and destruction of enemies.  After the WWII (esp. after the Korean War)  more emphasis on the primacy of the political aim.  Annihilation of enemies necessary in limited war?

20. WAR OF GERMAN UNIFICATION  Before 1871, German Confederation…  Rivalry between Prussia and Austria  3 Wars!  War with Denmark (1864)  Austro-Prussian War (1866): AKA Seven Weeks War Gross Deutch - w/ Austria Gross Deutch - w/ Austria Klein Deutch - w/o Austria Klein Deutch - w/o Austria  Franco-Prussian War (1870-71)

21.  War with Denmark 1864  To acquire Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark  Bismarck allying with Austria  Austrian declared war with Denmark!  Austro-Prussian War 1866  Dispute over S-H…  Bismarck thought that war with Austria was inevitable…  Preparing for war against Austria…

22.  Gross Deutch (w/ Austria) vs. Klein Deutch (wo/ Austria)  Saxony, Hanover, the Hesses, Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg – on the side of Austria…  “Battle of Koniggratz”  Austria is out! Austria agreed to the dissolution of the German Confederacy and the formation of the new North German Confederacy – Kingdom of Prussia  The war paved the way for the establishment of German Empire in 1871  Austrian reorganized in 1868 as the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy…

23.  Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871)  French became nervous after the 7 weeks war…  Bismarck thought that war with France was necessary to unify Southern German states…  Dispute over the successor to Queen Isabella… in 1878; Prince Leopold von Hohenzollenrn-Sigmaringen was supported by Prussia  Ems telegram incident  France declared the war first…  But French was not ready to fight Prussians…

24.  Prussians invaded back into Alsace and Lorraine… French were no match…  The war dethroned the French dynasty… Napoleon III captured as POW…  Prussia demanded harsh terms after the war… acquired A-L; asked for an indemnity of one billion dollars; proclaimed the New German empire in the French royal palace… ; marching through the streets of Paris…  The new German Empire – Wilhelm  Kaiser in 1871

26.  Political Objective of the Austro-Prussian War Prussian dominance! Increase Prussian sphere of influence! Assure Prussian hegemony by expelling A from the G Confederation… Prussian dominance! Increase Prussian sphere of influence! Assure Prussian hegemony by expelling A from the G Confederation… Bismarck wanted to exclude Austria from German confederation, but he didn’t want to make Austria a permanent enemy of Prussia. He tried to negotiate easy terms with Austrians… Austrians and Prussians became allies once again in 1878! Bismarck wanted to exclude Austria from German confederation, but he didn’t want to make Austria a permanent enemy of Prussia. He tried to negotiate easy terms with Austrians… Austrians and Prussians became allies once again in 1878!  Bismarck also feared French intervention!   Limited war with Austria

27. Civil-Military Conflict during the Seven Weeks War…  Moltke – Let’s smash Austria completely! March into Vienna!  But Bismarck thought differently!  France factor… Feared French intervention… “We don’t live alone in Europe but with other powers who hate and envy us”  Austria as a future ally… no intention to destroy A…  Moltke – why did we fight then?  Bismarck - Perfect military victory that Moltke desired would not have served the political objective of the war that B wanted to achieve!  In the end, B prevailed… not Moltke… laid the foundation for G unification…

28.  Objective of Franco Prussian War  Unification of Germany, not annexation of France...  Limited territorial aims..  Russia Factor…  Moltke and military was determined that Bismarck would have little say in how war will be fought this time…  Acquired A-L

29. Otto von Bismarck vs. Helmuth von Moltke  Goal: Unification of Germany Germany  Tactic: Regarding Prussian capabilities-we’re weak! capabilities-we’re weak!  Regarding Prussian intensions –we’re benign! intensions –we’re benign! *tactical victories were possible because of Moltke, but B made the unification possible…  First one who realized the significance of the significance of railroad to warfare railroad to warfare  A big fan of Clausewitz  “Victory through the application of armed force is application of armed force is the decisive factor in war… the decisive factor in war… the destruction of the enemy the destruction of the enemy forces will decide the outcome forces will decide the outcome of the war. This destruction of the war. This destruction thus constitutes the principal thus constitutes the principal object of operations” object of operations”

30.  Moltke was influenced by C, but Moltke differed from C in one very significant wary; Moltke attempted to maintain separate spheres for politics and war!  “At the mobilization the political adviser should fall silent. And should take the lead again when the defeat of the enemy is completed.” "Policy avails itself of war to attain its aims; it works decisively at the beginning and end of war, [and has] the right to increase its demands or be satisfied with a lesser success, bit in its actions [strategy] is fully independent of policy.” “political officers had no business to meddle in the military affairs…” Moltke  Tactical victory formed the center of Moltke’s vision of war  Clausewitz’s teaching on primacy of politics…

31. WORLD WAR I  Ask two critical questions!  What were the political objectives? Goals? Means?  What were the causes? Were there any conditions that made the war inevitable? Or individual choice?  Why do we have to care about WWI?  The first global war: 65 million men mobilized, 11-12 million lost lives, more than 21 million wounded.  Cost – 200 b $  Full mobilization  Total War; All-out War…  Repercussions in Int’l Relations: Beginning of drop  Europe as center of power; Emergence of US as a great power; the end of 19 th century imperialism… great power; the end of 19 th century imperialism…

32.  Revulsion followed enthusiasm; beginning to lose faith in the Liberal Capitalism (Liberalism) of the Enlightenment period … Revolutions in Central and Easter Europe.. advent of communism and fascism..  Extraordinary scholarly attention with regard to cause of WWI  “theory of inadvertent war” cause of WWI  “theory of inadvertent war”  War was not a choice!  Backgrounds - Int’l Environment  Bismarck after the WGU, “isolate France”  Bismarck formed the Three Emperor’s League G, Italy, and Austria-Hungary in 1872  Triple Alliance in 1882 Italy, and Austria-Hungary in 1872  Triple Alliance in 1882  B then signs secret treaties with Russians  Reinsurance Treaties  Isolation of France Reinsurance Treaties  Isolation of France

33.  William I died in 1888. William II clashed with B in Prussian policy toward Russia… B resigns in 1890  William II didn’t renew Reinsurance Treaty with Russians  Russo-Franco Alliance  Dual Entente in 1895 between France and R F would support R if R was attacked by G F would support R if R was attacked by G R would support F if F was attacked by G R would support F if F was attacked by G If any member of the Triple Alliance mobilized, both F and R would mobilize! If any member of the Triple Alliance mobilized, both F and R would mobilize!  Britain abandons policy of “splendid isolation.” Why?  Britain now begins to look for allies. Anglo-Japanese Alliance(1902). Entente Cordiale (1904) with France. Then treaty with Russia  Triple Entente  Triple Entente was formed against Triple Alliance

35.  The war to end all wars?  The first crisis between G and F (over Morocco in 1905)  Second crisis: Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908)  Serbia backed by Russian vs. Austria backed by Germany  Third Crisis (over Morocco again): Agadir Crisis (1911)  Fourth Crisis: Two Balkan Wars, 1914 & 1913  The assassination was the event which sparked off a whole series of events and crises

36.  Backgrounds-Social Structures and Moods  Oligarchic state structure and Fears of upheaval “Even if everything now goes smash, it will be all worth it!” (German Minister for War) “Even if everything now goes smash, it will be all worth it!” (German Minister for War)  Systemic Militarism * Period of huge military build-up… great powers of E started to copy the universal conscription, large reserves, and detailed planning of the Prussian system… armies and navies were expanded greatly! * Period of huge military build-up… great powers of E started to copy the universal conscription, large reserves, and detailed planning of the Prussian system… armies and navies were expanded greatly! * Huge influence of military – civilians didn’t understand the war plans.. * Huge influence of military – civilians didn’t understand the war plans.. * War is glorious and even fun * War is glorious and even fun

37.  Nationalism Panslavism of Serbia  Pangermanism of G and A-H… Panslavism of Serbia  Pangermanism of G and A-H… Blind nationalism… Blind nationalism…  Social Darwinism G’s policy toward E. Europe… G’s policy toward E. Europe…  Imperialism Great powers needed foreign markets… Great powers needed foreign markets… Social Darwinism justified the imperialism… Social Darwinism justified the imperialism…

38.  Causes(Interpretations) of WWI  Inadvertent War Thesis --- Fischer Thesis (Third Level) ---- (First Level) (Third Level) ---- (First Level)  Inadvertent War Thesis – Int’l System (military system and alliance system) that existed in Europe at the time led to WWI !!! (military system and alliance system) that existed in Europe at the time led to WWI !!!  P Bracken, P Kennedy, S Van Evera, T Schelling, M Howard, R Ned Lebow T Schelling, M Howard, R Ned Lebow

39.  How did the military system dictate the logic?  Rigid War Plan– worked out down to the last detail!! War plans were rigid and could not be adjusted to the changing political situations… War plans have a momentum of their own… Schlieffen plan Schlieffen plan The rigidity of Russian military plan The rigidity of Russian military plan Political leaders, ignorant of the military plans Political leaders, ignorant of the military plans

40.  Cult of Offensive : Stephen Van Evera O had the advantage over D O had the advantage over D War had to be won by quick and decisive offense War had to be won by quick and decisive offense  Interlocking mobilization system : Russian Mobilization would lead to German mobilization, and under the German war plan mobilization meant war Russian Mobilization would lead to German mobilization, and under the German war plan mobilization meant war