1. RISK PERCEPTION TOPIC 7

2. OVERVIEW o Collect Midterm #2 o Define Risk Perception o Bias and Heuristics o Risk vs Outrage o Outrage Factors o Risk Comparisons

3. PERCEPTION Definition: ◦the way you think about or understand someone or something ◦the ability to understand or notice something easily ◦the way that you notice or understand something using one of your senses ◦a judgment resulting from awareness or understanding Synonyms: ◦Discernment ◦Insight ◦Discrimination ◦Bias**

4. RISK PERCEPTION Intuitive judgments regarding risk Contributors: ◦“real risk” ◦Past experiences ◦Media ◦Social ◦Politics Components of Risk Perception: ◦Bias = prejudice or inclination towards a particular conclusion ◦Heuristics = informal rule to simplify decisions

5. TYPES OF BIAS 1. Ignoring Assumptions ◦Can be forgotten ◦Can be treated as facts instead of as assumptions 2. Ignoring Uncertainty ◦ALL RISK ASSESSMENTS HAVE UNCERTAINTY!! ◦Strongly believe certainty is required to move forward ◦Seen as cover-up or weakness

6. TYPES OF BIAS 3. Ignoring Trade-offs Between Risk and Money ◦Distasteful to put a price on human life ◦Required every time we fund a health and safety program or bill 4. Ignoring Small Numbers ◦Big numbers capture people’s attention ◦Can be manipulated to accomplish goal

7. TYPES OF BIAS 5. Hindsight Bias ◦Assumption that the past always predicts the future ◦“It won’t happen to me in the future, because it hasn’t happened to me in the past” 6. Context Bias ◦Past experiences with a hazard taint your perception of it ◦EX: nuclear power; petroleum 7. Conjunction Fallacy ◦Adding details can make perception more or less probable

8. HEURISTICS o Informal rule used to simplify decisions o Natural and necessary part of being human o We face complex decisions every day, these informal rules help us cope o Can lead to faulty judgements

9. TYPES OF HEURISTICS 1. Representativeness ◦Similarity of new events to known processes ◦Known processes help evaluate a new process ◦Use small samples or anecdotal evidence to make general assumptions about a population

10. TYPES OF HEURISTICS 2. Availability ◦Ease of imagining or recalling an event ◦Higher risk events lead to increased recall ◦Introduce element of hysteria, such as news events or other media…. ◦Personal experiences

11. TYPES OF HEURISTICS 3. Anchoring ◦Tend to stabilize (or anchor) our probability estimates toward first estimate ◦Initial risk estimates are a reference point ◦Used to improve consistency of subsequent estimates / studies ◦If initial risk estimate is inaccurate, this can lead to bias ◦The first estimate has a powerful influence on subsequent estimates

12. TYPES OF HEURISTICS 4. Framing ◦Risk perception depend on whether risk is expressed (or framed) as a gain or loss ◦Most people will prefer estimates with a positive outcome ◦EX: A plane carrying 100 passengers crashes, which estimate do you prefer?......

13. HAZARD VS. OUTRAGE o How do we persuade an apathetic public to take risks seriously? o What do we do when the public is excessively concerned over what experts say is minimal risk? o Why is there such a discrepancy? o Think of “hazard” as the expert’s perception of risk o Think of “outrage” as the public’s perception of risk

14. THE NINE “PUBLICS” 1. Industry 2. Regulators 3. Elected Officials 4. Activists 5. Employees 6. Neighbors 7. Concerned Citizens – has a desire to get involved in an issue 8. Experts – has specialized knowledge of a particular issue 9. The Media

15. EXPERTS VS “THE PUBLIC” o Public misperceives the hazards o Experts often misperceive the outrage o Trust plays a big role in risk perception o Experts see the public as incapable of understanding o Public sees experts as “covering up” problems

16. OUTRAGE 1. Outrage is as real as hazard 2. Outrage is as measureable as hazard 3. Outrage is as manageable as hazard 4. Outrage is as much a part of risk as hazard 5. Outrage is as much a part of your job as a risk analyst / manager as hazard

17. OUTRAGE FACTORS o People tend to over-estimate risks when outraged o People under-estimate risks when not outraged o Identified key components / factors that contribute to outrage o Add to anger and frustration o Often associated with controversial risk issues

18. 1. VOLUNTARY VS. COERCED o Individuals are more willing to assume risks if they are voluntary o 3x more likely to accept a “risky” event if it’s voluntary o Making it voluntary doesn’t mean it’s going to work, however …… o The right to say “NO” increases the possibility of saying “MAYBE” o Opens the issue up to discussion o May say “YES” to a smaller risk if they were part of the decision

19. 2. INDUSTRIAL VS. NATURAL o Industrial risk raises more outrage than natural risks o More human involvement = more outrage o Natural risks can cause more damage than industrial / manmade ones, but less outrage is generated. o Comparing natural risks to industrial risks may be perceived as a tactic to avoid blame or responsibility for an incident.

20. 3. EXOTIC VS. FAMILIAR o Exotic risks raise more outrage than familiar risks. o This concept helps explain the apathy towards certain high risk behaviors and situations. o Occupation safety professional deal with this problem constantly. o Can be useful in managing risks. o Make low, yet exotic, risks more familiar, so outrage is reduced.

21. 4. MEMORABLE VS. NOT MEMORABLE o Memorable risks raise more outrage. o Memorability is the opposite of familiarity. o Sources of memorability: o News o Historical data o Television and movies (fiction) o Personal experience o Acknowledge memorable risks, don’t hide / ignore them

22. 5. DREADED VS. NOT DREADED o Dread refers to fear or terror associated with certain outcomes. o Recognize and legitimate dread o Formulate an empathetic response o Help get the dreaded item / event / situation into context and under control o Greater chance of preventing outrage from escalating

23. 6. CATASTROPHIC VS. CHRONIC o Time factors o Catastrophes are quick and deadly o Chronic risks can be more deadly, but occur over a long period of time so the data / figures / statistics / results from short-term studies are unimpressive o Related to tendency to ignore small numbers o High-risk, low probability as seen by public and industry o Low-risk, high probability as seen by public and industry

24. 7. UNKNOWABLE VS. KNOWABLE o What can lead to knowability problems? o Uncertainty o Expert disagreement o Undetectability o Researching a risk can help reduce outrage simply because it is better understood. o Which of these risks would you prefer: o Fairly dangerous, but well understood? o Possibly safer, but uncertain and not well researched? o Individuals can manipulate uncertainty to excuse apathy, too.

25. 8. OUTSIDE CONTROL VS. INDIVIDUAL CONTROL o Some risks are controlled by individuals, some by society o Related to voluntariness but not the same o Voluntariness is who decides o Control is who implements o Most people feel as long as they are in control, risk is low o “Don’t worry, we’ve got everything under control” o Better approach is to learn how to share control….controlling risk is not a zero-sum game

26. 9. UNFAIR VS. FAIR o When risks are unfairly distributed, people get outraged. o Distribution of risk as it relates to distribution of benefits o “I know it’s risky, but, the benefits outweigh the risks…” o Often, the benefits are going different places than the risks o Concept of Environmental Justice o An unfair risk is a big risk, even if it’s not a big hazard o Share benefits in proportion to the risk

27. 10. IMMORAL VS. MORAL o When risk questions are reduced to a question of right or wrong, they tend to raise outrage. o Discussing trade-offs or cost-benefit analysis becomes unacceptable and callous when morality is in question. o Once you decide something is a moral problem as opposed to an instrumental calculation of harm done (or possibility of harm), negotiations are off! o Establish a shared morality with the public, or be seem as a villain.

28. 11. SUSPICIOUS VS. TRUSTED SOURCE o A suspicious source can calculate and express risk perfectly, but will still generate more outrage than a trusted source o Associated with the characteristics of a PERSON not the RISK o Whom do we trust? Whom do we perceive as untrustworthy? o Companies and agencies need to work / put effort into building trust with the public. o Building trust is a long-term prospect. o Losing trust is a lot easier than building it.

29. 11. TRUST CONT. o Companies and agencies lose track of what untrustworthy behavior is o Often see themselves as protecting the public interest when they withhold information or mislead people. o Can word studies in a way that’s technically correct, but intentionally misleading; a pattern of this breeds mistrust. o Professional ethics and integrity are essential. o Why do most people trust activists more than industry, or even government?

30. 11. TRUST CONT. o Replace the expectation of trust with accountability. o Hire outside contractors or objective third party to conduct studies. o Operate under the slogan “Track us, don’t trust us” o Giving the public “permission” not to trust you actually helps gain their trust. o Nobody wants to accept the idea that they cannot be trusted. o Ignoring accountability may be to protect ego, but it is perceived as dishonest. o Use the contract concept o Opposite of relying on trust o Enforceable o Negotiation will moderate both sides

31. 12. RESPONSIVE VS. UNRESPONSIVE PROCESS o Difference between a responsive, open posture and an uncaring posture can account for huge difference between perception of risks. o Components of a responsive process are: o 1. Openness vs. Secrecy o 2. Apology vs. Stonewalling o 3. Courtesy vs. Discourtesy o 4. Sharing vs. Confronting Community Values o 5. Compassion vs. Dispassion

32. 12.1 – OPENESS VS. SECRECY o Telling unpleasant truths proactively o Keeping secrets, withholding information o As a society, we are intolerant of keeping secrets (there’s that trust again) o When the public discovers a company or agency has withheld information, they assume it’s bad news and there was a cover-up. o Are you willing to bet the public won’t find out? o Are you willing to bet the public won’t be outraged when they do find out? o Secrecy provokes outrage even if the risk is low

33. 12.2 – APOLOGY VS. STONEWALLING o Apologizing for misbehavior o Not apologizing o Think about how do you feel when someone hurts, betrays, annoys you and doesn’t apologize. What do you need in order to forgive? o Steps to Forgiveness o 1. admit it o 2. say your are sorry (and mean it) o 3. make restitution o 4. promise never to do it again (create and implement a prevention plan) o 5. do a penance

34. 12.3 – COURTESY VS. DISCOUTESY o Courtesy is made up of lots of little things, and some big things o Closely related to customer service o Returning phone calls promptly o Keeping track of unanswered questions at a meeting or presentation. o Send those documents you promised to send o Notify people if you are going to be late for a meeting or a deadline o Interested parties who feel ill-treated will quickly become outraged o Discourtesy can be mistaken for stonewalling and now you have angry, frustrated citizens

35. 12.4 – SHARING VS. CONFRONTING COMMUNITY VALUES o Homophily = “love of the same”; tendency of individuals to associate with others who are similar. o Share the social and cultural values of your audience. o Politicians and spokespersons who live in the same community as their audience always do better than outsiders. o Believe someone cares because they are the same as you. o Only works if it is the truth.

36. 12.5 – COMPASSION VS. DISPASSION o Respond to people’s concerns compassionately instead of a detached, cold manner. o Technical people often have trouble with this, yet the good data is done by and the expert knowledge is possessed by technical people. o In general, the concerned public is emotionally invested in a potential risk. o Imagine a dispassionate technical expert and a concerned housewife… o How do they view each other? o Is there trust? (there it is again!) o Learning effective communication skills helps….more on that later

37. 13. VULNERABLE VS. AVERAGE POULATIONS o When children and other vulnerable populations are exposed to risks, the outrage increases. o We worry less about workers than the general public. o We worry more about children than adults. o We worry more about the elderly than young, healthy adults. o We worry more about fetuses than just about anything.

38. 14. DELAYED VS. IMMEDIATE EFFECTS o Delayed effects may raise outrage because of the uncertainty of when they will present themselves. o Serious risks “lie in wait” o Exception is a catastrophe o Risk assessors may discount delayed risks because it’s not tangible yet.

39. 15. AFFECTS VS. DOES NOT AFFECT FUTURE GENERATIONS o An even more delayed effect of a risk. o Will a landfill leak in 200 years? o Will it harm people who live there 200 years from now? o “We’ll cross that bridge when we come to it”

40. 16. IDENTIFIABLE VS. STATISTICAL VICTIMS o Whenever you can put a face on the risk, the outrage increases. o People take the risk more seriously if it is symbolized by an identifiable victim. o Sometime referred to as “Bambi Syndrome” o Statistical victims or victims without names or photos generate less outrage. o Examples o Photo of child with cancer who was exposed to a chemical. o Marine life tangled in garbage or covered in oil. o Pregnant woman holding glass of polluted water from her tap

41. 17. ELIMINATION VS. REDUCTION o Risks that can be eliminated entirely generate more outrage than risks that can only be reduced. o It is simply more satisfying to prevent or remove something than to mitigate or improve it. o If elimination is possible, it is the option the public prefers. o Reduction may be wiser and more cost-effective, but elimination speaks to the outrage.

42. 18. FEW BENEFITS VS. MANY BENEFITS o Risks with benefits generate less outrage than risks with few or poorly understood benefits. o We are happier making sacrifices when the benefit justifies the risk. o Examples o Gasoline needed for fuel outweighs many people’s outrage at oil drilling o Job created by new factory outweigh concern for hazardous conditions created by it’s presence in the neighborhood.

43. 19. MEDIA ATTENTION VS. NO MEDIA o This is more of a result than a cause. Can also be a feedback loop. o Media responds to outrage, it does not create it. o Media attention will: o amplify the outrage. o sustain it for longer periods of time. o attract more people to the source of the outrage. o If a risk controversy is of interest to the media, it is likely to grow.

44. 20. OPPURTUNITY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION VS. NO OPPORTUNITY o Collective action aka. Mob Behavior o Whenever there is a possibility for outrage within a large group of people, the outrage tends to feed upon itself. o For example, neighbors and friends forming a community action group to discuss emissions from a local factory, vs. concern over deforestation or diminishing wildlife populations. o May be helpful to address risk issues with individuals as opposed to a large open forum.

45. RISK COMPARISONS Explain a risk by comparing it to a better understood risk. When doing a risk comparison, remember that ◦1. Multiple comparisons might help overcome problems ◦2. All risk comparisons should be approached with caution ◦3. Should be made only when the calculated risks being compared have similar characteristics ◦4. Risk comparisons should never be primary basis for a decision

46. HIERARCHY OF RISK COMPARISONS 1. Most acceptable approaches are to compare risks with: ◦A) Standards; REL, RSL, PEL, MCL, etc. ◦B) Risks at different times; now compared to last year ◦C) Different estimates of the same risk; ours compared with Greenpeace 2. Less desirable approaches are to compare: ◦A) Risk of action with no action; should we buy respirators or not? ◦B) Compare alternatives; landfill risk is X, incinerator risk is Y ◦C) Same risk in other places; L.A. vs. Denver

47. HIERARCHY OF RISK COMPARISONS 3. Even less desirable approaches are to compare: ◦A) Average risk with a peak risk; exposures at home vs. factory ◦B) Specific risk to all sources; exposure accounts for 3% of all lung cancer 4. Marginally acceptable approaches are to compare: ◦A) Cost; reducing risk would cost X amount of dollars ◦B) Benefits; chemical would save lives if properly used ◦C) Occupational with environment ◦D) Risks from same source; chemical X compared to chemical Y from same exposure ◦E) Other risks from same disease; lung cancer from smoking vs radon

48. HIERARCHY OF RISK COMPARISONS 5. Rarely acceptable approaches: ◦Suggest acceptability of risk ◦EX: Exposure to chemical X vs driving your car ◦Unfamiliar risk of familiar activity ◦EX: Exposure to chemical X vs. aflatoxin in peanut butter

49. UNDERSTANDING RISK PERCEPTION 1. Risk is more than the assessed hazard. 2. People respond more to outrage than to assessed hazards. 3. Activists and media amplify outrage, but they do not create it. 4. When hazards are high, risk analysts should nurture outrage. When hazards are low, they should reduce outrage. 5. Companies and agencies usually cannot reduce outrage until they change their own organizations.

50. REVIEW o Define Risk Perception o Bias and Heuristics o Risk vs Outrage o Outrage Factors o Risk Comparisons

51. QUESTIONS?