1. 10. Security and Physical Protection Basic Concepts

2. Physical Protection System
A Physical Protection System (PPS) is the integration of people, procedures, and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage, or other malicious human attacks
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

3. PPS Objectives: Prevent Theft and Sabotage
Deter the Adversary
Implement a PPS which all adversaries perceive as too difficult to defeat
Problem: deterrence cannot be measured
Defeat the adversary with PPS
PPS functions required: detection, delay, response
Actions of response force prevent adversary from accomplishing his goal
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

4. Deterrence By definition is:
“the act or process of discouraging actions or preventing occurrences by instilling fear or doubt or anxiety”
Deterrence is one useful security functions in managing the insider threat

5. Components that have a deterrent effect:
Deterrence
Components that have a deterrent effect:
enforcement and prosecution
barriers
access control systems
signage
closed circuit television
policy and procedures
employee trustworthiness checking
information security etc...
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

6. Deterrence

7. Exercise 1 – Module 9
Using a facility that is familiar to you, list as many existing elements that would deter an adversary. In addition list further elements that you believe would further enhance deterrence.

8. Physical Protection System Functions
PPS Functions
Detection
• Intrusion Sensing
• Alarm Communication
• Alarm Assessment
• Entry Control
Delay
• Passive Barriers
• Active Barriers
Response
• Interruption:
– Communication to Response Force
– Deployment of Response Force
• Neutralization
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

9. Detection Purpose
Provide detection of any attempted unauthorised access to the area or facility where the radioactive source is located.
Provide detection of any attempted unauthorised access to the equipment housing the radioactive source.

10. Detection
Detection can be typically achieved by one of the following means:
Electronic Sensors
Human Surveillance
Video motion detection via a Closed Circuit Television system (CCTV)

11. Example - Radioactive Source Storage Room
Exterior
Windows
Source B
Adjacent
Interior Room
Target Room
Source A
Interior Door
Exterior Door
Exhaust Vent
(near ceiling)
Exterior
Walls

12. Exercise 2 – Module 9
For the example source storage room on the previous slide, indicate where electronic detection sensors could be installed to detect an unauthorized access attempt.

13. Example Detection Sensor Layout
Passive
Infrared Sensor
Vibration Sensors
Source B
Glass Break
Sensors
Adjacent
Interior Room
Tamper Switches
Source A
Balanced Magnetic
Reed Switches
Passive
Infrared Sensor
Vibration Sensors
Active Infrared Sensor

14. Detection Performance Measures: Probability of Detection
Alarm
Activated
Alarm
Communication
Alarm
Reported
Alarm
Assessed
Performance Measures:
Probability of Detection
Time for Communication and Assessment
Frequency of Nuisance Alarms
Probability of Assessment
Another
Nuisance?
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

15. Detection - Assessment

16. Purpose: To assess the cause of each reported alarm activation
Assessment
Purpose: To assess the cause of each reported alarm activation

17. Assessment
Assessment can be typically achieved by one of the following means:
Response Force (roving guard patrols, emergency services)
Technological means such as an Closed Circuit Television system (CCTV)
Human Surveillance

18. Provide Obstacles to Increase Protective Force (Guards)
Delay
Delay
Provide Obstacles to Increase
Adversary Task Time
Physical Barriers
Protective Force (Guards)
Performance Measure:
Time to Defeat Obstacles
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

19. Delay Purpose
Ideally to provide sufficient delay after the detection and assessment phase, to allow response personnel to interrupt and defeat the adversary.

20. Delay Example Security Measures: Fences Cages and walls,
Security containers,
Strong rooms with three dimensional containment (floor, walls and ceiling)
immobilisation of equipment
Securely anchoring the equipment to nearby building structures such as walls, and floors
Installing obstacles prohibiting the equipment from being wheeled away

21. Example Hospital Facility
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

22. Response Performance measures
Communicate
to Response
Force
Deploy
Response
Force
Defeat
Adversary
Attack
Performance measures
Probability of communication to response force
Time to communicate
Probability of deployment to adversary location
Time to deploy
Response force effectiveness
Action by protective forces to prevent adversary success
Can’t respond if they don’t know something is going on
DEPLOY - deploy means get from where they are to where they are needed to engage the adversary
Response force effectiveness generally depends on the numbers, training, and equipment of the response force as compared to the threat.
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

23. Response Practical Implementation
The response time after detection should be designed to be less than the time required to breach the barriers and tasks required to remove or sabotage the radioactive source.
The response team should be of sufficient size and capability to defeat the adversary.
Plan and response procedures should include the involvement of local law enforcement, and emergency services.
The adequacy of the procedures should be defined in consultation with the regulatory authority.
Exercised and tested (threat level based).

24. Effective response Interaction with Outside Agencies
Written agreement or understanding
Key issues for consideration
Role of support agencies
Communication with support agencies
Off-site operations
Joint training exercises
The winning combination:
Right people and planning
Right equipment
Right training
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

25. The Principle of Timely Detection
Deter
Actions
Mitigate
Results
Begin
Action
Task
Complete
Time
Adversary Task Time
First
Alarm
Detect
Alarm Assessed
Respond
Adversary
Interrupted
PPS Time Required
Delay
Defeat T A T T I C T
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

26. Exercise 3 – Module 9
Determine whether timely detection is possible for following attack scenario
Scenario 1:
The response force cannot respond in their normal (average) time (e.g., they are responding to a higher competing priority elsewhere in the hospital). It takes the response force twice as long as their normal time to respond.

27. Exercise 3 – Module 9
Determine whether timely detection is possible for following attack scenario
Scenario 2:
An alarm indicates the entrance door to the research wing was opened, but it cannot be confirmed for a long period of time (e.g., the camera viewing the entrance is out of focus, so the university alarm monitoring station dispatches a security personnel to visually inspect the area and assess the situation). It takes twice as long to assess the alarm.

28. Exercise 3 – Module 9
Determine whether timely detection is possible for following attack scenario
Scenario 3:
The position sensor on an exterior emergency exit door fails to activate when an intrusion occurs (i.e., the sensor does not work). A second sensor (another position sensor on an interior door) is activated at a point on the diagram which is 2/3 of the way into the first detection, had the first sensor been working. Detection time for the second alarm is the same as the first alarm.

29. Exercise 3 – Module 9

30. Characteristics of an Effective Physical Protection System
Defence-in-depth
Series of detectors better than a single one
Prefer to use complementary sensors that use different principles
Balanced protection
Does not create an easy path for adversary
Applies to Detection as well as Delay
PPS based on threat, and the Graded Approach.
Enough Detection, Delay, and Response
Meet the “System Effectiveness” criteria
One feature can compensate for another's weakness
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

31. Defence in Depth
Layer 1 – Physical Security – Perimeter - Lighting, Fences, Guards & Patrols, inspections & checks

32. Exterior & Interior Lighting
Inspections & Checks
Perimeter Fences
Layer 1 – Physical Security – Perimeter - Lighting, Fences, Guards & Patrols, inspections & checks
Guards Patrols

33. Exterior & Interior Lighting Instructions, Orders & Policies
Audit Trails
Inspections & Checks
Instructions, Orders & Policies
Logon & Passwords
Perimeter Fences
Layer 2 – IT Security – logon and passwords, encryption, audit trails, Orders & Policies
Reminder that everything in ASNET is audited – mention the Classified Media Register as part of this
Encryption
Guards Patrols

34. Exterior & Interior Lighting
Audit Trails
-employee trustworthiness check
Inspections & Checks
Instructions, Orders & Policies
Laws & Legislation
Legislation
Logon & Passwords
Perimeter Fences
Layer 3 – Laws and Legislation – vetting personnel
Recruitment Background Checking
Encryption
Guards Patrols

35. Exterior & Interior Lighting
Audit Trails
-employee trustworthiness check
-Alarms
Inspections & Checks
Access Control
Instructions, Orders & Policies
Laws & Legislation
ID Cards
Logon & Passwords
Perimeter Fences
Legislation
Level 4 – Physical Access control – ID cards, alarms, detection devices
Detection Devices
Recruitment Checks
Encryption
Guards Patrols

36. Exterior & Interior Lighting
Audit Trails
-employee trustworthiness check
-Alarms
Classification
Inspections & Checks
Access Control
Instructions, Orders & Policies
Laws & Legislation
ID Cards
Access Control
Locks
Perimeter Fences
Legislation
Logon & Passwords
Categorisation
Layer 5 – categorisation and classification
Detection Devices
Recruitment Checks
Encryption
Guards Patrols

37. Exterior & Interior Lighting
Audit Trails
-employee trustworthiness check
-Alarms
Classification
Detection
Inspections & Checks
Access Control
Instructions, Orders & Policies
Laws & Legislation
ID Cards
Access Control
Physical Measures
Locks
Logon & Passwords
Perimeter Fences
Strong Rooms
Legislation
Containers
Categorisation
Layer 6 – secure rooms strongrooms, containers and vaults and vaults
So – security is achieved when …
Detection Devices
Recruitment Checks
Encryption
Guards Patrols

38. Graded Physical Protection Requirements
The level of protection required for a facility should be commensurate with the potential hazard posed by the facility.
Graded concept of security measures based on:
Anticipated threat
Relative attractiveness
Potential consequences of malevolent actions
The need for beneficial use of the source
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

39. SUMMARY
While we would like to deter the adversary, we must be prepared to defeat him
We also must be prepared for failure in our attempt to defeat the adversary because nothing is 100% effective
We use Detection, Delay, and Response working together to interrupt the adversary
We use the response force to defeat the adversary
We are talking mostly about an outsider, but do not forget the insider threat
The level of required protection should be commensurate with the potential hazard
Allan Murray lecture, 29 August 2005

40. Thank You!
Questions?