1. The Legacy of Ancient Greek Philosophy Prof. Rob Koons St. Louis King of France May 28, 2014

2. Plato’s Theory of “Forms” A “Form” is the kind of essence that Socrates sought: the Form of Justice, the Good, Humanity, etc. Forms are not physical objects, nor something private, subjective or merely mental. A “third realm”. Examples: mathematical objects, like the triangle. For Plato, material objects (including us) are faint, imperfect copies of some perfect Form. This fact has normative implications: something is a better F the more perfectly it copies the form of the F. Better triangles, better men. In modern philosophy, Plato’s Forms are classified as “abstract objects”. They are typically called “universals”.

3. The Philosophy of Aristotle Aristotle (388-322 BC) was Plato’s student. Influenced all later Christian philosophers, including Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Wrote on many subjects: biology, chemistry, astronomy. Best-known: Categories, Metaphysics.

4. “Moderate” Realism about Universals Aristotle agreed with Plato that universals (forms) must exist to make science and thought possible. However, he rejected the idea that material objects were mere “copies” of separately existing Forms. Instead, he insisted that the Forms existed “in” particular objects. A universal (like humanity or justice) exists only insofar as there actual humans or just people.

5. Species and Genus Genus Differentia 1 Differentia 2 Species 1 Species 2

6. Primary vs. Secondary Substance Reverses Plato’s priorities: it is the (changeable) particular substance that is most real (most fully substantial). Secondary substances are substantial only in a “qualified way”: by referring to classes (natural kinds) of substances. Species are more fully substantial than genera, because closer to individuals.

7. Substance vs. Accidents Besides substance, the other “categories” (quantity, quality, relation, etc.) are categories of ‘accidents’. Individual accidents are “present in” substances, in such a way that there is a one-way dependency of the accident on its substantial bearer.

8. The Possibility of Change “It is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities (accidents), the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself.” Example from Physics, 1: “the unmusical man becomes musical.”

9. Denials of the Possibility of Change Denied by Parmenides and his disciples (the Eleatic philosophers). Zeno (the creator of the famous paradoxes, like Achilles and the tortoise) was one of these. Argument from the impossibility of thinking of the non-existent. Change involves a transition from non-being to being (or vice versa). However, it is impossible for some thing to have non-existence.

10. Denials of the Possibility of Change Argument from the causal impossibility of change. –Any new thing must come from either being or non-being. –If it comes from being, it already exists, and so isn’t new. –Nothing can come from non-being. –Consequently, no new thing can come to be.

11. Potential and Actual Being Aristotle rebuts these arguments by introducing a distinction between two kinds of being: potential and actual. To speak or think of a thing, it must have at least potential being, not necessarily actual being.

12. The Causation of Change Change comes from both being and non-being (in different ways). For a change to occur, there must be something that exists before and after the change (the substance). There must also be the absence or privation of some accident (e.g., being non-musical). The non-musical man becomes musical (i.e., a musical man). Change begins with a combination of being (as a substance) and non-being (of an accident in the substance).

13. Causation Requires an Agent - 1 When change happens, there was already a potentiality for the new state in the changing thing. Potentialities for new states are rooted in the actual nature of a thing, not just in what we can imagine or conceive of.

14. Causation Requires and Agent - 2 In addition for a potentiality for change in the thing that changes (the “patient”), we also need an outside “agent”, with an active power of producing the change. This “agent” must exist separately from the “patient”, or else we could not explain why the change did not happen sooner: the change happens only when the agent and patient come into mutual contact (or appropriate proximity) with one another.

15. This Applies also to Animals and Persons Animals and people may appear to act spontaneously, with no external agent, but we can in fact always find an agent-patient pair. In many cases, the organism is stimulated into action by some perceived change in the environment. In every case, we can find some part of the organism acting upon some other part: such as molecules in the in the stomach or heart acting upon neurons, which in turn act on the brain, stimulating further behavior through perception of some internal state.

16. Potentialities always Depend on Actuality In a sense, these are complementary notions. However, actuality is more fundamental than or “prior to” potentiality, in several ways: The potentiality of a thing is always grounded in its actual nature. A potentiality is always a potentiality for some kind of actuality, not vice versa. Actuality is prior in definition. Potentialities are never actualized except by the presence of actual agents. As a consequence, a being of pure actuality is possible, but not a being of pure potentiality.

17. The Necessity of Stability Heraclitus had said: “All is flux,” and “You can’t step twice into the same river.” Suggesting that nothing whatsoever endures from one moment to the next. Aristotle argues that this is impossible. Change implies that something is changed: the thing changed must in some respects endure. In simple case: substances endure, accidents change.

18. What about Substantial Change? There are two kinds of change that don’t fit Aristotle’s simple model (as presented in The Categories): generation (creation), and destruction of substances. Aristotle believed that some substances: plants, animals, perhaps blobs of pure element or mixture, do come into and go out of existence.

19. Aristotle’s Physics, Chapter 1 In this chapter, Aristotle introduces the notion of ‘matter’ (hule -- lumber). Matter = “the primary substratum of each thing from which it comes to be without qualification (I.e., from which it is generated), and which persists in the result (after the thing is destroyed).” Substratum = that which endures through a change.

20. In what sense does the matter endure? Not as actual substance. For Aristotle, one substance cannot be composed of, constituted by another substance or substances. A substance is a thing that exists in and of and by itself, not through the existence of other things.

21. Generating & Destroying a Complex Individual Substance B complex A Particles Actuality Potentiality A Particles

22. Aristotelian Matter is Hierarchical The residue which would exist at the animal’s death is the proximate matter of the animal. What if those substances were also destroyed? Then some further substances would exist - the more remote matter of the animal. At the ideal limit -- we would reach “prime matter”.

23. What would Prime Matter be Like? It can never exist as such. Aristotelian matter always exists in some form or other. It is much closer to modern ideas of energy (or mass-energy) than to Newton’s or Boyle’s conception of “matter”. It lacks even dimensionality and quantity. It’s what “survives” through radical transformations of energy from one form (and even one quantity) to another.

24. Form and Matter Aristotle’s view is called ‘hylomorphism’ (or ‘hylemorphism’). Substances are “composed” of both form (morphe --- the same word Plato used) and matter (hule -- Aristotle’s coinage). Socrates’ humanity is his form: that by which Socrates exists, that by which his matter is his matter (as opposed to an actual corpse).

25. Form is the Actuality; Matter is Potentiality The “matter” of a substance is its potentiality to produce new substances, either by extruding parts of itself, or by being utterly destroyed and leaving behind some residue of itself. The “form” of a substance is its actual nature, here and now. The form explains what active powers and passive potentialities a thing has. This is why a being of pure actuality, like God, must be immaterial.

26. Pure Form Just as actuality is prior to potentiality, so form is prior to matter. Thus, it is possible for a substance to exist as pure Form (God, the angels, the human soul after death and before the resurrection), but it is impossible for anything to exist as pure, unformed Matter. The human soul can exist after death because its pure intellectual functions (unlike the functions of non-rational animality, like sensation) don’t require physicality in their very definition.

27. Rejecting Dualism Nonetheless, before death (and after the Resurrection) human beings are (like other animals) body-soul (or matter-form) composites. The rational soul acts as the form of the body – fully responsible for the body’s being (in actuality) a living, organic thing. Leads naturally to the “theology of the body” (as John Paul II put it). What happens to the body has spiritual significance – the body’s isn’t a mere external contraption attached to an essentially immaterial human being.

28. The Four “Causes” The Material Cause: what is a thing made of? The Formal Cause: what is the fundamental nature of a thing? What is it? The Efficient Cause: what agent brought this thing into existence? The Final Cause: what is the end or purpose for which the thing exists? These obviously apply to human artifacts, tools. Also to organs. Aristotle argues that all four apply universally, to all substances. The most controversial is the last one.

29. Final Causation In the inorganic world: consider cycles, like the water cycle or rock cycle. Each stage exists “for the sake of” the next one. The basic laws of nature are not just regularities (Nancy Cartwright). They represent the ways things (electrons, photons) act, their active powers and passive potentialities. Powers and potentialities point forward, to a possible future. This is the final cause. Aquinas: “Every agent acts for an end, otherwise one things would not follow from the action of the agent more than another.” (ST I, q44, a4) Final causation is the “cause of causes”, the fundamental basis for all explanation.

30. Implications of Final Causation Biology is thoroughly teleological: ‘genes’, ‘enzymes’, ‘cells’, ‘organs’ – all are defined in terms of their function. The natural function of the human intellect is the basis of the distinction between reason & madness, knowledge & opinion, science & pseudo-science. The natural function of the human will is the basis of ethics and political philosophy: the human person is naturally ordered to the life of justice and virtue.