1. Today’s Lecture Preliminary comments on epistemology Epistemology and our knowledge of the external world - some preliminary considerations. René Descartes

2. Writing a philosophy paper There are a few simple rules to writing a good philosophy paper. (1) Make sure that you properly understand the position advocated by the philosopher you are examining. (2) Make sure your account of this philosopher’s position is accurate. (3) Do not make any claims for which you offer no defense.

3. Writing a philosophy paper (4) Only make claims for which you offer evidence that can be plausibly regarded as adequate. (5) Do not conclude more than your evidence will justify. (6) Do not try to prove your thesis.

4. Writing a philosophy paper (7) Avoid broad sweeping (or categorical) claims or conclusions. (8) Always consider objections to your thesis.

5. Preliminary comments on Knowledge There are three traditional aims of epistemology: (1) To provide an analysis of knowledge, (2) tell us the scope or extent of our knowledge, and (3) rebut or refute the epistemological skeptic. Epistemological skepticism is marked by a refusal to make positive claims of knowledge about ourselves, the world, abstract objects or the realm of the supernatural. The ‘or’ in the previous sentence is inclusive. This is to accommodate the fact that epistemological skepticism comes in degrees.

6. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Three distinctions are useful when doing epistemology (at least in the so-called Western tradition): Foundationalism versus coherentism, internalism versus externalism, and a priori versus a posteriori knowledge.

7. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Both foundationalism and coherentism are theories about justification, or the epistemic relations that must hold between beliefs if they are to be properly regarded as justified. Think of the justificatory structure of beliefs according to foundationalism as if it were a house. On the bottom you have a foundation. Then you have the walls and the roof. Without a good foundation the house will not be stable.

8. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Foundational beliefs are known as basic beliefs. The non-foundational beliefs that make up the rest of the ‘structure’ of your belief system are non-basic beliefs. Basic beliefs are those beliefs in our belief system that are regarded as justified without any reference to other beliefs. Non-basic beliefs receive their justification from either other non-basic beliefs or basic beliefs. The justification of all our non-basic beliefs ultimately rests on our basic beliefs.

9. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Foundationslists disagree over what basic beliefs are properly basic. Properly basic beliefs are beliefs that are justified without any reference to other beliefs. One set of criteria for proper basicality you can find in the literature is: A belief that p is properly basic if and only if it is self- evident, incorrigible or evident to the senses.

10. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Think of the justificatory structure of beliefs according to coherentism as if it were a huge circle of distinct points or a web. According to coherentism there are no beliefs that are justified independently of other beliefs. Coherentists deny the existence of properly basic beliefs.

11. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Beliefs are justified (in large part) by their relations with other beliefs. You can think of the justificatory structure as if it were a circle with p being justified by q, which is justified by r, which is justified by s, and so on until we get to a belief n that is justified by p again.

12. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Alternatively, you can think of the justificatory structure as if it were a web with no one belief gaining its epistemic strength solely from itself or a non-belief. Rather, each belief epistemically supports and is supported by other beliefs.

13. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Take care not to confuse these theories of justification with psychological theories about how our beliefs are actually related to each other (in our head) or to experience. You could be a coherentist about justification and still believe that we have basic beliefs that arise directly from our experience and, in turn, give rise to other beliefs that would not arise were it not for the appearance of these basic beliefs.

14. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Internalism is basically the view that our beliefs do not possess positive epistemic value unless they are justified by evidence that is (1) within our ability to find and (2) and which we can relate to these beliefs as justifiers (even if we actually do not).

15. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Externalism is basically the view that our beliefs can possess positive epistemic value if we stand in a right relationship to the relevant states of affairs (which our beliefs are about) or if our belief forming mechanisms or processes are reliable (produce substantially more true than false beliefs when used in those circumstances for which they were ‘designed’).

16. Preliminary comments on Knowledge Remember that positive epistemic value comes in a spectrum with knowledge at one extreme (being those beliefs that possess the most positive epistemic value) and (merely) rational beliefs at the other extreme (being those beliefs that possess the least positive epistemic status without losing value or becoming negatively valued.) Justified beliefs and warranted beliefs fall somewhere along the spectrum.

17. Preliminary comments on Knowledge A priori knowledge is knowledge that is acquired ‘before experience’. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge that is acquired ‘after experience’.

18. Epistemology and our knowledge of the external world - some preliminary considerations. Consider the following problem. Our beliefs about the external world are (largely) grounded in experiences that we believe to be the effect of objects out in the world impacting our senses. Our beliefs about objects in the external world, then, are primarily informed by experiences that are not themselves the objects in question.

19. Epistemology and our knowledge of the external world - some preliminary considerations. The truth value of these beliefs depends on their accuracy. Can we get beyond, or behind, our experiences to compare our beliefs to the objects-in-themselves?

20. René Descartes: Preliminary comments He was born in 1596 and died ‘before his time’ in 1850. He not only engaged in what we understand as philosophy, but also in the science of optics, physics, psychology and mathematics.

21. René Descartes: Preliminary comments Descartes is associated with a movement known as Continental Rationalism. There are a number of features of Rationalism associated, rightly or wrongly, with Descartes’ epistemology. (1) Reason is privileged over the senses as a source of knowledge about ourselves and the world. (Knowledge derived from reason alone enjoys a higher status than knowledge derived from the senses alone.)

22. René Descartes: Preliminary comments (2) This is largely because the senses are regarded as a less reliable source of knowledge (about ourselves and the world) than reason. (3) The senses are an acceptable source of knowledge (about ourselves and the world) when corrected and constrained by reason.

23. René Descartes: Preliminary comments Descartes’ epistemology is foundationalist. In the Meditations Descartes appears to use self-evidency and indubitability as criteria for regarding beliefs or (epistemic) principles as properly basic.

24. René Descartes: Preliminary comments Descartes desires to have our beliefs about the world formally derived from basic beliefs or the application of principles that are themselves free from reasonable doubt or are self-evidently true, or from other non- basic beliefs that find their own justification in such properly basic beliefs or principles (or from yet more non-basic beliefs so justified).

25. René Descartes: Preliminary comments Descartes is also internalist. The basic method of doubt suggested in the Meditations points to the importance of justifying our beliefs (at some point in our life), or at some point ensuring that our beliefs are properly grounded or secured against reasonable doubt.

26. René Descartes: Preliminary comments Descartes is not an epistemological skeptic of our knowledge of ourselves, the world or the nature and existence of God.

27. René Descartes: “Synposis of the following six Meditations” Some things to note in this synopsis. (1) The First Meditation proffers a method of doubt which is to be used to help us abstract ourselves away from our many preconceptions about ourselves and the world, and to break our dependence on the senses when talking of truths about ourselves and the world (FP, p.145).

28. René Descartes: “Synposis of the following six Meditations” (2) In the Second Meditation Descartes hopes to show that (i) our most certain knowledge is not derived from the senses (ii) and involves our own existence. Note that his discussion of the distinction between the soul or mind and the body in this Meditation is conceptual rather than metaphysical. It is not until later (the Sixth Meditation) that Descartes is going to suggest that the mind is, actually, a distinct thing from the body (FP, p.146).

29. René Descartes: “Synposis of the following six Meditations” It is also important to note that Descartes does not merely assume that what we can clearly and distinctly conceive is true. This is a claim for which he will argue (though not in the First or Second Meditations). This claim will be predicated, in large part, upon the facts that God exists, is omnibenevolent, omniscient and omnipotent and has created us such that if we use our sense faculties and faculty of reason carefully (i.e. reflectively) we can acquire clear and distinct ideas, which are, in turn, true.

30. René Descartes: The First Meditation There are two motivations for his method of doubt that Descartes mentions in the first paragraph of this Meditation (FP, p.147). (1) He had believed many falsehoods in his childhood, and this raised legitimate doubts about the truth of the beliefs he now held (as they were acquired cumulatively and taken to be true in part because of their relation to his earlier beliefs), and (2) a stable and lasting science requires foundations that are free of reasonable doubt.