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11 March 2004 Madrid Bombings A Prehospital Analysis

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1 11 March 2004 Madrid Bombings A Prehospital Analysis
Alfredo Serrano Moraza, M.D. María Jesús Briñas Freire, E.M.D. Andrés Pacheco Rodríguez, M.D. Alejandro Pérez Belleboni, M.D.

2 Evidence-based disaster medicine
Scientific approach Evidence-based disaster medicine Analytical work Systematic sources acquisition and register Exhaustive methodological evaluation Ethical principles Patiens and relatives confidentiality EMS teams’ work respect Useful and exportable approach Look for and design an evaluation-tool for similar MCIs Whe outline this is a technical document strongly bound to these general principles. Our principal aim is to make some light on some specific lessons from that day.

3 The key EMS Emergency does NOT finish on scene
While Police and Fire-Rescue Emergency could finish on focus EMS Emergency does NOT finish on scene Critical-bed needs coordination has impact on pts. morbi-mortality As you really know, while Police and Fire-Rescue Emergency could, perhaps, finish on focus, EMS Emergency does not finish on scene. This is one of the milestones of mass-casualty incidents (MCI) prehospital assistance. It’s the key for integrated work. After initial units dispatch efforts, this was the preferential Coordination Centre work. Indeed, critical-bed needs coordination has impact on patients morbi-mortality. Up to date, our present data suggest this could happen on March-11. * No references yet

4 NY 9-11 vs. Madrid March-11 Approx. one / multiple focus
9/11 McKinsey report 9/11 Commission full report No official report Approx. one / multiple focus Critical patients almost absent / overload EMT-Parameds. EMS / Phys. based EMS No victims between Emergency teams Others ED red labels ...when they arrived We begin showing the principal differences between NY 9-11 and Madrid March-11. Our comparison data arise from NY McKinsey’s report. Specially, in March-11 our prehospital system took directly care of more that 500 patients. Hospital registers show 1430 patients assisted in the first 24 hours. The total amount rises to approximately 1900 total patients. In NY 9-11, these patients did NOT arrive at ED Hospitals. Finally, our prehospital model, a more european modelo, is physician-based from the begginnig, with essential changes in prehospital care.

5 Advanced support 31 18 13 8 + 1 Coord. (4-8 coord.) 11 2 mICUS mICUS
María Jesús Briñas Rescue Jeseník 2004 31 mICUS Phys + Nurs + 1 EMT 18 mICUS Phys + Nurs + 2 EMTs 8 + 1 Coord. Phys + Nurs + 1 EMT VIR 13 (4-8 coord.) VIR Phys OR Nurs + 1 EMT Phys + 1 EMT usually for home non-emergency medical visit UAD 11 2 Phys + Nurs EMTs + pilot + mechanic HEMS Total approx. 80

6 Atocha María Jesús Briñas Rescue Jeseník 2004 SAMUR SUMMA mICUs VIR UAD Feedback information Medical Post organization Dead 34 Total victims SUMMA/SAMUR 6 deceased in place 12 critical SUMMA 15 critical SAMUR 30 severe wounded Work time approx. 2h 7:49-8:00

7 Santa Eugenia SAMUR 2+1 2 - SUMMA 4+1 - -
María Jesús Briñas Rescue Jeseník 2004 7:50 mICUs VIR UAD SAMUR SUMMA MP organization Dead 17 Total victims 52 SUMMA/SAMUR 4 critical SAMUR 10 severe SAMUR 6 severe SUMMA Work time approx. 1 h 15 min.

8 El Pozo The face of death María Jesús Briñas Rescue Jeseník 2004 First units: Police, Fire-Rescue and basic support Heroical citizen support Wild massive evacuation Hour ? mICUs VIR UAD Helo SAMUR SUMMA There’s no physical MP 8:50 More units, also Helo 9:00-9:15 There’s another bomb Train evacuated Rescue stopped Dead 67 Total victims 56 SUMMA/SAMUR 4 critical SAMUR 2 critical SUMMA 45 almost unknown ambulances Work time approx. 1 h 15 min.

9 Téllez St. SAMUR 2+6 2 - - SUMMA 4 - 2 -
María Jesús Briñas Rescue Jeseník 2004 Confussion for ½ hour Original IC is not available Victims are evacuated to next sports centre SAMUR SUMMA mICUs VIR UAD Helo Dead 64 Total victims 83 perhaps 2 deceased in place ?? 7 critical rest is confusing Work time approx. 2h 25 min.

10 Hospital data Dead Wounded Discharged Critical Hard severe Severe
Slight injuries Dead As you know, these are the official data from the same March-11 night. Hospital data Consejería de Sanidad March 11, 21 h

11 Closest hospital overcrowd
Robregordo Montejo de la Sierra La Hiruela Acebeda Prádena del Rincón Horcajo Madarcos Braojos Nava- rredonda Puentes Viejas Buitrago Lozoya Gargantilla Berzosa Puebla de la Sierra Robledillo Garganta de los Montes Lozoyuela El Atazar Cervera de Patones El Berrueco La Cabrera Valde- manco Bustarviejo Canencia Rascafría Torrelaguna Caba- nillas Navala- fuente Venturada Miraflores de la Sierra Talamanca de Jarama Valdepié- lagos Soto del Real Colmenar Viejo Manzanares el Real El Vellón Valdetorres del Jarama Collado Mediano Cercedilla Guadarrama cerrada Los Molinos Villalba Hoyo de Tres Cantos San Sebastián de los Reyes Alcobendas Algete Fuentelsaz Valdeolmos Alapardo Ribatejada Valdeavero Fresno de Torote Cobeña Daganzo Meco Camarma Esteruelas Paracuellos Alcalá de Henares Los Santos de la Humosa Anchuelo Santorcaz Torrejón de Ardoz Coslada San Fernando Villalbilla Corpa Pezuela Alameda Valverde Pozuelo del Rey Nuevo Baztán Olmeda de las Fuentes Ambite Villar del Olmo Velilla Rivas- Vaciamadrid Arganda del Rey Campo Real Valdilecha Orusco Carabaña Brea de Tajo Valdaracete Estremera Fuentidueña de Tajo Villarejo de Salvanés Villamanrique Belmonte Tielmes Perales de Tajuña Valdelaguna Chinchón Villaconejos Morata de Aranjuez Ciempozuelos Valdemoro Getafe Pinto Parla Fuenlabrada Leganés Casarrubuelos Serranillos del Valle Móstoles Pozuelo de Alarcón Villamanta Villaviciosa de Odón Navalcarnero Aldea del Fresno Villa del Prado Cadalso de los Vidrios Cenicientos Rozas de Puerto Real Alcorcón Boadilla del Monte Brunete Majadahonda Las Rozas de Madrid Torrelodones Galapagar Valdemaqueda Santa María de la Alameda El Escorial Zarzalejo San Lorenzo de El Escorial Navas del Rey Pelayos de la Presa San Martín de Valdeiglesias Robledo de Chavela Fresne- dillas Navalagamella Valdemorillo Villanueva del Pardillo Villanueva de la Cañada Colme- narejo Quijorna Colmenar de Arroyo Ajalvir Mejorada del Campo Loeches de las Torres Torres de la El Molar Serna Pinilla Valle Ala- me- da Villa- vieja El Álamo Arroyo- molinos Moraleja de Enmedio Batres Cubas de la Sagra Griñón Humanes la Calzada Somosierra Villamantilla Perales Chapi- nería Sevilla la Nueva Velasco San Martín de la Vega de Oreja Titulcia Guadalix Pedrezuela San Agustín Becerril El Boalo Moralzarzal Torre- mocha Gascones Piñuécar Horca juelo Redueña Alpedrete MADRID Madrid Red labels 5 17 H Gómez Ulla Doce Oct. Gregorio M. 1 1 14 5 91 15 30 1 But, correctly presented, the reality talks by itself of nearer ED overcrowding. Three nearer hospitals, Gregorio Marañón, Doce de Octubre y Gómez Ulla received 159 red labels. We show some preliminar causes for this in next slide. 38 2 12

12 Different EMS-ED data Why ?
Deceased # 191 minus 20 Red labels bypass SAMUR 44 to 49* 1 fallecido de camino SUMMA 21* plus 20** Random Assignment* On-scene deceased 14* to 20** Communications irregular failure ? Hospital EDs 233 85-90 143 ? Admittable sub-triage or no available unit basic transport ? Massive evacuation ? Different classification systems Ex: ED no yellow labels Official SAMUR data talk us of patients evacuated in advanced support units. One patient died on the way. Same data of SUMMA patients show they assisted and transported a total advanced amount of patients. On scene estimations and some other data tell us about people deceased. Then, we may have a total red labels of Hospital data register 243 red labels in the first night. The, what’s the reason of these different EMS-ED data? First of all, it’s clear both have different classification systems. Second, all EMS-assisted MCI may have a legitimate sub-triage difference. Or, perhaps, no available unit. In the image on the right, we can see a green-label walking patient who received a craneotomty afterwards. Third point, data collection in focus is not always easy. Fourth, and in some instances, the most important factor –in fact, focus-dependent-, tragedy’s size and some other factors contributed to the existence of a variable people-guided scoop and run evacuation. Difficult focus data collection * official data ** estimated

13 evacuated to hospitals by EMS?
In MCI, are most victims evacuated to hospitals by EMS? Madrid March 11 38.6 % red labels 58.6 % global © Jeffrey Arnold, MD

14 Two differents services Two different Coord. Centers
Lessons learned 80 % accuracy* Two differents services Two different Coord. Centers Infrastructural deficiencies Enormous citizens’ collaboration SUMMA Communications irregular failing Enormous Firefighters, Police and public-private efforts SUMMA Planification deficiencies EMS good job Four simultaneous focus Incident related SAMUR on-scene good organization SUMMA Dispatch Center good job SAMUR random-Hospital evacuation philosophy Inadequate philoosphy ? ED and Hospitals good job Mild to moderate Massive evaquation and Scoop and run 63 % red labels Closest hospitals critical patients’ overload Impact on morbi-mortality ? * 80 % accuracy

15 Thank you Madrid, my friends, Madrid, my brothers:
You cannot see my tears: - I have no more but can you really hear my words crying for you? Thank you very much.


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