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UNDG Joint Programs Lessons Learned

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Presentation on theme: "UNDG Joint Programs Lessons Learned"— Presentation transcript:

1 UNDG Joint Programs Lessons Learned
Philippe Grandet (UNFPA) based on an independent report by Charles Downs UNDG – Donor Meeting on Multi-donor Trust Funds 11 February 2013 New York

2 What are the Joint Programmes?
Pooled Parallel Pass-through

3 Key elements of a Pass-through JP
Joint Programme document Steering Committee Administrative Agent Standard legal documents

4 Distribution by modality
Total of each Modality of Joint Programme Modality of JP Quantity Value Number Percent USD million Parallel 263 26% 184 6% Pooled 178 17% 352 11% Pass-through 539 52% 2,391 77% Combination 40 4% 163 5% Total 1031 100% 3,090 Nearly 90% of the 526 JPs in the current records of MPTF Office, UNICEF and UNFPA are funded on a pass-through basis.

5 Evolution over 10 years Year Pass-through Others Total value ($ million) 2002 and prior 2 17 8.2 2003 4 32 18.0 2004 12 78 122.3 2005 28 121 491.8 2006 16 51 79.4 2007 83 55 483.8 2008 102 31 617.8 2009 104 27 537.5 2010 62 20 261.5 2011 65 9 272.3 The peak during the period is linked to the establishment of the MDG-F. Pass-through JPs became a constant feature of the funding architecture.

6 Who participates? 41 UN Organizations have been involved in JPs.
The five UN Organizations that most frequently participate are: UNDP (present in 68% of the JPs) UNICEF (57%) WHO (27%) UNFPA (44%) FAO (23%) The number of Participating UN Organization in any given joint programme ranges from 2 to 16. 72% JPs involve 4 or less agencies (82% 5 or less).

7 Where? In what contexts? Country Income Level Number of JPs
Low Income Country 367 Lower Middle Income Country 453 Upper Middle Income Country 204 High Income Country 7

8 The survey Input from staff dealing with JPs in the headquarters of 10 UN Agencies An on-line survey that received responses from 329 UN staff at country-level A mission to three case countries (Ecuador, Nepal and Uganda) to obtain national Government and donor perspectives

9 Reasons to establish a JP
“Good fit for the programme” is definitely the best reason. The programme must drive the funding. Other reasons are not necessarily bad but we (donors, HQs, RCs, Government) must be careful about not creating undue pressure if the modality is not the right fit. To increase effectiveness, the programme must drive the funding mechanism.

10 Aid effectiveness The current JP guidance note is in the spirit of Paris and Accra: national Government is given a key role (signatory of JP document, member of Steering Committee). However, some respondent to the survey perceived guidance as too UN-centric. Revision should emphasize the aid effectiveness benefits and the role of Governments.

11 Factors of success (1) Limited number of UN Participating Organizations: Balance between inclusiveness and effectiveness More than 80% of survey respondents indicate that the number of PUNOs should never exceed 4 to 5 A significant budget: Frequency of very small JPs has fallen over the year Still 39% of JPs post 2008 have a budget below $1 million. Small JPs may have a political value or fulfill specific purposes Below a certain threshold, transactions cost are too high (to be discussed)

12 Factors of success (2) Sufficient time:
designed for development programming and not for quick impact projects. 60% of respondent indicate that duration should be at least three years (75% two years) Strategic engagement with Non-Resident Agencies: NRAs can provide valuable technical expertise JPs can provide an excellent point of entry Lack of regular presence is an obstacle to participation in management and coordination structures.

13 Joint Programmes and Aid Effectiveness by Fund Experience
Transaction costs Joint Programmes and Aid Effectiveness by Fund Experience (vertical axis: 2=Strongly Agree, 1=Somewhat Agree, -1=Somewhat Disagree)

14 Joint accountability for results
Lack of joint accountability is a weakness: targets remain agency targets, neither AA nor the PUNOs are accountable for the JP as a whole This should be addressed through: Strengthening of the governance structure An indicative allocation of 3% to 5% of the budget for M&E Providing an overview of the full budget (beyond JP budget)

15 The governance/coordination structure
Currently: Guidelines only make reference to the Steering Committee In practice, many different models with some degree of confusion For large JPs, the report recommends: A policy-level Steering Committee with donors and Government An operational coordination committee A coordination unit

16 The Administrative Agent function
Selection: Selection of the AA purely on administrative not programmatic capacity all agencies are not currently equipped to provide the same level of services. Being entirely dedicated to perform the AA functions, the MPTF Office offers the highest quality of services. Closure of JPs: Financial closure is a major challenge for AAs. Handling of unspent balance is problematic and should be agreed beforehand.

17 Reporting Recommendation:
Official reporting (narrative and financial) on an annual basis Informal reporting more frequent (quarterly or semi-annual) to strengthen joint monitoring/management by the coordination structure.

18 What next? Revision of the UNDG guidelines on Joint Programmes:
Issue of threshold Closing procedures Management/coordination structure Continue training efforts: Understanding of the modalities Strategic use of Joint Programmes

19 Thank you


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