1. The Access Card Barbara Flett
Assistant Secretary, Office of Access Card Department of Human Services
Roger Clarke Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation also Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd and Visiting Professor, ANU, UNSW, HKU
U3A, 17 July 2007, Hughes ACT 1

2. The Howard Government’s Proposed National ID Scheme
Roger Clarke, Chair, APF Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd Visiting Professor, ANU, UNSW, HKU
U3A, 17 July 2007, Hughes ACT 1

3. The Need for Social Control
Government Services and Welfare Programs must be conceived and managed in order to:
achieve their economic and social aims
control waste
control abuse
Each service necessarily involves personal data
A limited amount of inter-organisational data comparison is needed to achieve the aims

4. The Need(s) for Privacy
Philosophical
Psychological
Sociological
Economic
Political

5. The Need(s) for Privacy
The Dimensions of Privacy
Philosophical
Psychological
Sociological
Economic
Political
Privacy ...
of the Person
of Personal Behaviour
of Personal Communications
of Personal Data

6. The Scope of an Identification Scheme
Specific-Purpose for individual organisations or programmes cf. Medicare, AusStudy, AbStudy

7. The Scope of an Identification Scheme
Specific-Purpose for individual organisations or programmes cf. Medicare, AusStudy, AbStudy Bounded Multi-Purpose e.g. European Inhabitant Registration schemes limited to tax, social welfare and health insurance (cf. the TFN – but can Australian politicians be trusted?)

8. The Scope of an Identification Scheme
Specific-Purpose for individual organisations or programmes cf. Medicare, AusStudy, AbStudy Bounded Multi-Purpose e.g. European Inhabitant Registration schemes limited to tax, social welfare and health insurance (cf. the TFN – but can Australian politicians be trusted?) General-Purpose National Identification Schemes e.g. USSR, ZA under Apartheid, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, Finland

9. National Identification Schemes – Features
1. A Database
centralised or hub ('virtually centralised')
merged or new
2. A Unique Signifier for Every Individual
A 'Unique Identifier'
Or A Biometric Entifier
3. An (Id)entification Token such as an ID Card, whether 'smart' or not

10. National Identification Schemes – Features
4. QA Mechanisms for:
(Id)entity Authentication
(Id)entification
5. Obligations Imposed on:
Every Individual
Many Organisations
6. Widespread:
Data Flows including the (Id)entifier
Use of the (Id)entifier
Use of the Database
7. Sanctions for Non-Compliance

11. The Benefits Are Illusory
Genuinely Bad Guys (Terrorists, Money-Launderers, SIM-Providers to Terrorists, Organised Criminals, Illegal Immigrants, ...)
Mere assertions of benefits, no explanation:
‘it’s obvious’, ‘it’s intuitive’, ‘of course it will work’, and other simplistic notions like ‘Zero-Tolerance’ and ‘we'll sacrifice absolutely anything that might help us wage the war on terrorism’
Analyses undermine the assertions
Proponents avoid discussing the analyses
Easily avoided or subverted by serious opponents
The Benefits Are Illusory

12. Leahy in The Brisbane Courier-Mail, 19 July 2005

13. Miscreants (Benefits Cheats, Fine-Avoiders, Visa-Overstayers. ...)
Lack of detail on systems design
Continual drift in features
Double-counting of benefits from many programs
Analyses undermine the assertions
Proponents avoid discussing the analyses
Social complexity and constructive 'looseness' are demanded, hence persistent cheats to prosper
Benefits May Arise, But Are Seriously Exaggerated

14. Origins of the 'Access Card'
Lobbying of the Howard Government by a Small Coterie of Businessmen
Support for a National ID Scheme Project from national security and law enforcement
Failed Medicare Card Replacement Project
Opportunity provided by Qld Premier Beattie
Hockey's Ambitions
Ruddock dropped the overt National ID scheme in favour of Hockey's covert 'Access Card'

15. A National ID Scheme The ‘Access Card’ 1. A Database
centralised or hub ('virtually centralised')
merged or new
2. A Unique Signifier for Every Individual
A 'Unique Identifier'
Or A Biometric Entifier
3. An (Id)entification Token such as an ID Card, whether 'smart' or not
1. A Register:
a lot of data
several identifiers
id auth. documents
2. Unique Signifiers
a 'Unique Number'
& an 'official name'
& a biometric
3. A Single Card
a 'smartcard'
one data-storage zone
visible data

16. A National ID Scheme The ‘Access Card’ 4. QA Mechanisms for:
(Id)entity Authentication
(Id)entification
5. Obligations Imposed on:
Every Individual
Many Organisations
6. Widespread:
Data Flows including the (Id)entifier
Use of the (Id)entifier
Use of the Database
7. Sanctions for Non-Compliance
4. Registration, Onerous and Costly, with all power in the Government's Hands
5. Obligations
To Provide the Card
To Demand the Card
6. Many Agencies with:
Access to the Data
Use of the Card
Use of the Identifier
7. Denial of Services

17. The ‘Access Card’ is a National ID Scheme
A National Identification Scheme is a general-purpose scheme, designed to achieve consistent and reliable identification of humans, throughout a country, particularly in their dealings with governments and government agencies, but also with private sector organisations
Its purpose is to entrench the power of the State over individuals

18. Reasons for Opposing the National ID Scheme
Privacy-Invasiveness
Onerousness
Intentional Lack of Protections
A 'Honey-Pot' Inviting Abuse
High Costs
Low Benefits
Vast Extension of the Power of the State through a Single, Consolidated ID

19. How can I help prevent the introduction of a national identification scheme?
Inform Yourself
Inform Others
Contribute to the Work of Appropriate Organisations
Influence Change
Conduct Research
Conduct Research and Advocacy with the A.P.F.

20. The Howard Government’s Proposed National ID Scheme
Roger Clarke, Chair, APF Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd Visiting Professor, ANU, UNSW, HKU
U3A, 17 July 2007, Hughes ACT 1

21. The Access Card Barbara Flett
Assistant Secretary, Office of Access Card Department of Human Services
Roger Clarke Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation also Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd and Visiting Professor, ANU, UNSW, HKU
U3A, 17 July 2007, Hughes ACT 1

23. The '17 Cards' Medicare (6 cards in 4 programs): 1. Medicare card
2. Organ Donor Registration Card
3. Reciprocal Health Care Agmt Card
4. PBS Safety Net Entitlement Card
5. PBS Concession Card (no info)
6. Cleft Lip and Palate Card
Dept of Veterans' Affairs (4 cards, 3 programs):
1. DVA Gold Repat Health Card
2. DVA White Repat Health Card
3. DVA Pharm. Benefits Card (The Orange Card)
4. War Widow's Tpt Concession Card
Centrelink (6 cards, several programs):
1. Pensioner Concession Card
2. Health Care Card
3. Foster Child Care Card
4. Low Income Healthcare Card
5. Commonwealth Seniors Card
6. Electronic Benefit Transfer (single-use)
Australian Hearing Services (single-use voucher)

24. The '17 Cards' Myth The 17 Cards are mostly mutually-exclusive
Few people have more than one or two of them
So very little 'wallet-bulge' / 'purse-clutter' will be saved
Few of the 17 Cards have to be produced very often at all
The primary circumstances appear to be:
a new relationship with a health care professional or organisation
when seeking a concession using the card as evidence, esp. for public transport, in council offices and in theatres and cinemas
But many concessions will cease to be visually obvious
And every organisation has to install a card-reader
And every organisatio has to handle and machine-read every card
The Access Card will seriously harm pensioners' interests

25. 'Access Card' Politics
Refusal to publish the Cost-Benefit Analysis, subsequent partial release, currently denied under FoI
Sleight of hand used in talking about financial benefits
Refusal to publish the original PIA
Resignation of the original Task Force Heads because their Recommendations were ignored
Hockey's "pilots are for aircraft"
Use of the Fels 'Privacy Task Force' as a shield, avoiding any form of engagement with the public, yet with the Minister declining its Recommendations
DHS Secretary blunders before the Senate C'tee
Senate C'tee, incl. Govt members, rubbishes the Project
Replacement of the DHS Secretary
Failure to reflect submissions (or even read them?)
Attempt to let tenders without Parliamentary approval

26. Moir, The Sydney Morning Herald, on 28 April 2006

27. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
A Process whereby the potential impacts and implications of proposals that involve potential privacy-invasiveness are surfaced and examined
Involves identifying stakeholders, publishing information, seeking comment, and reflecting that comment
Starts early, and continues throughout the project
Ensures aims can be achieved, benefits realised, and negative aspects avoided or ameliorated
Ensures public confidence
Ensures public acceptance and adoption
Pre-empts negative coverage by the media
Avoids unnecessary intervention by legislatures 2

28. 'Access Card' Project Management
Vast Scale ("largest IT project in the world")
Arbitrary and Ridiculously Tight Deadlines
Untested Technologies
Unclear Req uirements
Rapidly Changing Requirements
Hockey's "pilots are for aircraft"
Huge Media Scepticism
Huge Risk of Public Rejection
Total Failure to Engage with the Public Interest
Seriously Annoyed Tenderers, left in limbo
Low Staff Morale, Staff Turnover, Loss of Corporate Memory
In Summary: The Archetypal IT Project Disaster

29. Reasons for Opposing the National ID Scheme
Extraordinarily privacy-invasive and onerous Registration Requirements
The Bill's Safeguards are (designed to be) full of holes, and fall far below basic OECD norms of the 1970s
Creates a 'honey-pot' of ID data
Costs greatly outweigh savings
Impacts on the Disadvantaged defeat the nominal aim of improved access to health and social service benefits
Details of the design have not been disclosed (or even specified?)
The Cost-Benefit Analysis has been suppressed from the outset
Parliament should never be forced to consider a Bill without project details
The haste to implement the scheme is unjustified because more effective alternatives have not been explored
The Proposal consolidates the many identities each person has with many different agencies into a single Government-approved identity.
If a person transgresses, then:
their benefits can be denied
access to services can be denied
external travel can be denied
internal travel can be denied
their identity can be denied
Internal passports were used in South Africa under apartheid, and in Soviet Russia. They are feared in Singapore and Malaysia.
Similar measures have been emergent in the US and Australia for some time, e.g. air travel, toll-roads, passports, now the Access Card.

30. Organisations Expressing Serious Concern
Australian Privacy Foundation
Councils for Civil Liberties
Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC)
'Access Card No Way' Campaign
UNSW Cyberspace Law & Policy Centre (CLPC)
Electronic Frontiers Australia (EFA)
Melbourne Indymedia
...
Australian Democrats
The Greens
Labor Party
Consumers' Health Forum of Australia (CHF)
Australian Medical Association (AMA)
...
Privacy Commissioner (Cth)
Privacy Commissioner (Vic)
Information Commissioner (NT)
The ACT Government
National Party Senators
Liberal Party backbenchers

31. Does the Public Support the Proposal?
20 July 2005: 62% agreed / 6% undecided / 32 % opposed
"introduction of a national ID card with a photograph"?
Gary Morgan: "Australians are clearly in favour ... This is driven by the fear of terrorist attacks and illegal immigration ... many people would like to see the identification card replace other forms of identification, but there are still some concerns regarding privacy and the effectiveness of the card in combating terrorism"
30 April 2006: Yes - 32% No - 68%
After terrorism was withdrawn as a justification
"Should Australia introduce a compulsory ID card?
28 Feb 2007: Yes - 28% No - 72% 2,385 people voted in a poll in 'The Age'
As the details become known, the low levels of support will plummet further
In July 1985, 68% in favour, 7% undecided, 25% opposed
In July 1987, there was massive opposition and the Australia Card collapsed

32. Does the APF Have Something Positive To Say?
The APF supports specific, balanced proposals to meet important objectives re welfare benefits administration and, separately, health benefits administration
The APF supports the appropriate use of smartcard technology to achieve those objectives
Features of an appropriate scheme are:
No multi-purpose identifier; Retain multiple single-purpose identifiers for each agency and program
1 card with 17 zones; Each zone, identity and data-set to be securely separated from the others
No bureaucratically-imposed 'official name'
No Central Register of personal data

33. 'If I’ve got nothing to hide, why should I be afraid of a National Identification Scheme?'
'Everybody has something to hide'
your bank balance and your bank account PIN
the reason for your last visit to the doctor
whether you have ever seen a psychiatrist
how you and yours voted at the last election
the contents of the files that spam put on your computer
Some people have lots to hide, incl. criminals, but also 'persons at risk' ... domestic violence, protected witnesses
A Single Controlled Identity is a Weapon of Political Power
You're not just trusting this Government; You're forcing your descendants to trust every Government ever

34. Alternatives to 'Everybody has something to hide'
• People need to 'be less visible'
• People need to 'be harder to find'
• People need to protect some 'personal space' around themselves
• People need to be able to sustain 'social distance' from other people, especially from large, impersonal institutions
• People need a front door that they can close and lock
• People need to be able to 'draw the curtains', around their lives as well as their living room
• People need to be able to avoid going forth naked into the world
• People need to avoid having to deal on an unequal basis with organisations that have a lot of information about them
• People need to sustain their ability to make their own decisions and determine their own lives, rather than have powerful institutions do it for them

35. Glib Retorts to 'If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear'
If I'm not doing anything wrong, you have no cause to watch me
The government gets to define what's wrong, and they keep changing the definition
You might do something wrong with my information
Quis custodiet custodes ipsos? (Who watches the watchers?)
Absolute power corrupts absolutely
The Jews in the Polish ghettoes had nothing to hide. The Jews in The Netherlands didn't either. Nor the educated people in Cambodia. And they all died in their hundreds of thousands
There will always be another bigotry