1. 66th MI BDE Baseline Briefing
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE
2D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
66th MI BDE Baseline Briefing
THREAT
AWARENESS and
REPORTING
PROGRAM
This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED.
TARP is the new SAEDA.
UNCLASSIFIED

2. THE ARMY’S TARP REGULATORY GUIDANCE Army Regulation 381-12,
“Threat Awareness and Reporting
Program (TARP)”
All Army personnel are required to
receive a TARP briefing at
least on an annual basis
(Reviewing this slide presentation
on your own does not meet the
annual training requirement.)
Directs “all members of the Army,
military and civilian, be knowledgeable
of their reporting responsibilities under
this regulation… National Security
Decision Directive 197”

3. NATIONAL SECURITY CRIMES
Subversion
Espionage
Sabotage
Terrorism
Subversion: Advocating, causing, or attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces or civilian personnel with the willful intent to interfere with, impair or influence loyalty, discipline, or morale.
Espionage: The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving national defense information with the intent or reason to believe that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
Sabotage: Act(s) with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and national resources.
Terrorism: Activity that: Uses violence or the threat of violence to attain goals, political, religious, or ideological in nature. …involves criminal act that is often symbolic, intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.

4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Serbian Intelligence
Jordanian General
Intelligence Department
Russian FSB
(counterintelligence)
Russian SVR
(former KGB)
FBI uncovered over 100 countries collecting against the US with 28 countries involved in espionage operations against the US
In early 1992, the FBI changed its strategy to counterintelligence and began to investigate any country that was targeting the US with their intelligence services.
The FBI uncovered over 100 countries collecting against the US, with 28 different countries publicly identified as involved in running ESPIONAGE operations against the US. This list includes both allies and adversaries.
Russia has been the predominate recipient of information from American spies, but 17 other countries have also been willing recipients.
The key point is that threat comes not ONLY from those countries that we TRADITIONALLY think as threats to the US, i.e. Russian, China, Republic of Iran, North Korea, Cuba…. But also from countries that WOULD normally we thought as friendly to the US, i.e. Israel, France, Jordan, Iraq, Taiwan, Philippines….
Syrian Military Intelligence
Israeli MOSSAD
French DGSE

5. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND INTENTIONS:
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TARGETING
What do they want?
PLANS, OPERATIONS AND INTENTIONS:
NATO and the United States will always have adversaries who are willing to go to great lengths to obtain any information about our Armed Forces
Tactical and strategic capabilities?
Unit locations and readiness?
Missions, plans and intentions?
Unit problems?
Force Protection vulnerabilities?
Base closures and future stationing?
Not necessarily "classified" information!
Foreign espionage efforts greatly intensify during periods of conflict!

6. THEREFORE, EVERYONE HERE IS
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TARGETING
EVERYONE ASSOCIATED
WITH THE U.S. ARMY HAS A PIECE OF THE PUZZLE THAT MAKES UP THE BIG PICTURE FOR A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
THEREFORE, EVERYONE HERE IS
A POTENTIAL TARGET
Keep in mind that you do not have to possess a SECRET or TOP SECRET CLEARANCE, to be of interest to an intelligence service.
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED information can be as critical to a Foreign Intelligence Service as CLASSIFIED information.

7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY
SPOTTING
ASSESSING
MONEY
IDEOLOGY
COMPROMISE
EGO
The collection cycle for recruiting an agent or source, consists of three basic phases: SPOTTING, ASSESSING, and the RECRUITMENT.
All three phases revolve around MOTIVATION –
Money was always the traditional motivating factor, especially for Americans.
That has changed in recent years, and IDEOLOGY has become more and more the principle motivator for Americans to commit espionage.
RECRUITING

8. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Who could be a spy?
Spies do not look or act like the characters portrayed in Hollywood!
A spy could be anyone… a fellow Soldier, a co-worker, a neighbor, a family member, a translator, a local national employee …
The PURPOSE of this briefing is AWARENESS. To HELP make YOU aware of the indicators of espionage -- INORDER FOR YOU TAKE THE NEXT STEP AND REPORT SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.
Past espionage cases have demonstrated that co-workers and supervisors have overlooked obvious indicators of espionage which, had they been reported, would have minimized the damage to national security.
Profile of an American Spy - SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES
Most espionage by Americans is committed by men
Before 1990, most spies were white
Since 1990, less than half have been white
Since 1990, 83% were 30 years or older
FOREIGN INFLUENCES, FOREIGN PREFERENCES, AND DIVIDED LOYALTIES
Before 1990, roughly 80% of American spies were native-born citizens
Since 1990, this has fallen to 65%
Since 1990, the percentage of American with foreign connections (relatives or close friends overseas) increased to almost 60%.
Divided loyalties, holding or acting on allegiance to a foreign country, has increased dramatically since 1990 – almost 60% today.
EMPLOYMENTS AND CLEARANCE
During the Cold War periods, equal number of civilians and military engaged in espionage.
Since 1990, almost 70% of spies have been civilians.
Among civilian spies, one-fourth have been employees of government contractors.
Proportion of individuals holding NO security clearances have increase steadily over time, from 20% in 1980 to 40% in 1990.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ESPIONAGE
Most espionage by Americans has been short lived and poorly paid.
Almost half of American spies received nothing for the risks they took.
Only four individuals over 50 years may have received $1 million or more.
Since 1990, 40% of spies were caught immediately or in less than 1 year
Only one-fifth of known cases lasted 5 years or longer.
70% of RECENT American spies have volunteered and were not recruited
Seven of the 11 most recent cases since 2000, the individuals used the internet to volunteer their services
The former Soviet Union used to be the ultimate recipient for information, with almost 80% of US spies passing information to the Russians
However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, few – only 15%-- of Americans have sent information to Russia
Asian and Southeast Asian countries have now become the more common recipients
Also Central and South American countries, especially Cuba, have significantly increased their collection efforts
Five Americans are known to have, or in one case are alleged to have, volunteered to spy for Al Qaeda or related terrorist groups

9. ALDRICH H. AMES, GS-14, CIA CI Officer
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Money, Foreign Contacts, Security Issues
Indicators: Severe financial indebtedness from a divorce settlement. Threat of bankruptcy followed by undue and unexplained sudden affluence. Unreported foreign contacts and travel. Poor job performance. Career disappointments. Serious and repeated security violations. Alcohol abuse. Repeated irresponsibility.
ALDRICH H. AMES, GS-14, CIA CI Officer
Volunteered to spy for the USSR Government for 9 years. Was paid $2.7 million.
In 1985 the CIA began an investigation for a possible mole in the Agency.
Nine years after the compromises began the Agency found their spy.
Ames was arrested February 1994 and pled guilty to espionage in April 1994.
Brief history.
In June 1962, Ames was first employed by the Agency as a GS-4, document analyst.
Ames's first overseas posting took place between 1969 and It was not a successful tour, and the last performance appraisal stated that he was unsuited for field work and should spend the remainder of his career at CIA Headquarters.
In 1981 – 1983 he was again assigned as a field agent to Mexico City.
In Mexico City, Ames became involved in an intimate relationship with the Colombian cultural attaché, Maria del Rosario. Ames also developed a problem with alcohol.
In 1983 he returned to CIA Headquarters, to a position which gave him access to the Agency's worldwide Soviet operations.
In the spring and summer of 1985, Aldrich H. Ames began his espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union.
In 1986, he was re-assigned to Rome. He once again began to drink heavily, particularly at lunch and had less than a successful assignment.
In 1989, he returned to CIA Headquarters. In 1991 he was assigned to the Counter-Narcotics Center, until his arrest in 1994.
WHAT WERE AMES'S STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES?
poor overall job performance history, bottom 10% of the CIA's GS-14s.
failed to report foreign travel
never reported his intimate relationship with Rosario as a "close and continuing" relationship
committed repeated serious security violations,
in 1976 he left a briefcase full of classified information on a New York subway train
in 1985 he left his office safe open and unlocked upon departure for the evening, he also began using his home computer for classified work
and in the most extreme example, Ames wrapped up five to seven pounds of classified documents in plastic bags in June 1985 and carried it out of Headquarters to deliver to the KGB.
Alcohol abuse – started in 1983 and only worsened over the years, BUT was never seen as a serious problem by his bosses
Finances – In , he was facing severe financial problems. Rosario moved in with him in December 1983 and he was faced with a credit squeeze that included a new car loan, a signature loan that had been "tapped to the max," mounting credit card payments, and, finally, a divorce settlement that he believed threatened to bankrupt him.
He first contemplated espionage between 1984 and early 1985 as a way out of his mounting financial dilemma. Confronting a divorce and facing added expenses connected with his imminent marriage to someone with already established extravagant spending habits.
In late 1989, after his return from Rome, Ames' s lifestyle and spending habits had changed as a result of the large amounts of money he had received from the KGB in return for the information he provided.
Ames made no special efforts to conceal his newly acquired wealth and, for example, paid cash for a $540, 000 home. This unexplained affluence was brought to the attention of the CIA in late The preliminary results of the inquiry were not considered particularly significant at the time.
WHY DID HE COMMIT ESPIONAGE?
Ames said the primary motivating factor for his decision to commit espionage was his DESPERATION regarding financial indebtedness he incurred at the time of his separation from his first wife, their divorce settlement and his cohabitation with Rosario.
his fading respect for the value of his work
his belief that the rules that governed others did not apply to him
By and large his professional weaknesses were observed by Ames's colleagues and supervisors and were TOLERATED BY MANY who did not consider them highly unusual. Ames was seen by his supervisors and co-workers on the "not going anywhere" promotion track.
He was sentenced to DEATH, but agreed to a plea bargain of LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE for his cooperation in doing a damage assessment.
Ames revealed more than 100 covert operations and betrayred more than 30 operatives spying for Western intelligence services.
Ames was the old school spy. Spied for MONEY, spied for the Soviet Union. AN INSIDER.
Compromised over 100 covert intelligence operations. Betrayed at least 30 agents, 10 of whom were later executed by the Soviets.
Caught in 1994 after an intense CIA & FBI mole hunt. Sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.

10. BEN-AMI KADISH, DAC (Retired)
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Security Issues, Strong Ethnic Ties and Loyalties
Indicators: Strong ethnic ties and loyalties to a foreign country. Unreported or concealed contacts with foreign nationals. Unauthorized removal of classified material from work area. Attempts to obtain information without a need to know; or information not cleared for.
BEN-AMI KADISH, DAC (Retired)
84-year old US citizen, retired mechanical engineer
Supplied secrets to Israel from 1979 to 1985
Connected to the Jonathan Pollard case of 1986
Arrested Apr 2008 on four counts of conspiracy, released on a $300,000 bond, pending court date
Told the FBI he spied because he believed it "would help Israel."
Former civilian employee has been indicted by the federal government for allegedly conspiring to pass U.S. military secrets to Israel.
Kadish's handler was the same Israeli intelligence officer who worked as the Scientific Attaché in the Israeli Consulate General in Manhattan and was the handler for Jonathan Pollard, who spied for Israel and China, and is currently serving a life sentence for espionage in North Carolina.
Kadish went underground in 1986 when Pollard was arrested, but maintained contact with his handler as late as a day before his arrest.
Kadish worked for 18 years at Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal, from 1963 – 1990.
When he retired in 1990, he was a supervisory engineer in Fuze Division.
Prosecutors say Kadish for six years routinely checked out classified documents from the Research Center's library and let his Israeli handler photograph them in his basement. The FBI reports that he provided between 50 and 100 classified documents. The Israeli agent would give him a list of "specific items to obtain from the library."
He accepted no cash in return, only small gifts and occasional dinners for him and his family.
Kadish was born in the United States, but grew up in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine and fought with the Israeli resistance against the British. He also served in both the British and American military during World War II. 10

11. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Ideology , Divided Loyalty or Allegiance to the U.S.
Indicator: Strong ethnic ties and loyalties to country of birth. Unreported contacts with foreign nationals. Unreported trips to foreign countries. Obtains information without a need to know.
LEONADRO ARAGONCILLO, FBI Analyst & former USMC E-7 assigned to the White House Security Detail
Admitted passing TOP SECRET and SECRET information to fractions trying to overthrow the Philippine President
His lawyer said, "It was his sole intention to help the people of the Philippines"
Arrested Sep 05, convicted May 06, pled guilty to four counts of transmission of national defense information
Sentenced to 10 years in prison, fined $40,000
ARAGONCILLO worked under two administrations in the Office of the Vice President of the United States, VP Gore and VP Cheney.
Pled guilty to transferring national security documents classified as high as TOP SECRET to his Philippine co-conspirators between October 2000 and February 2002.
Motivation was to assist senior Philippine politicians in their attempts to destabilize and overthrow the president and Government of the Philippines.
He was recruited by senior Philippine government officials in the Summer of 2000, who he met as part of his official Marine Corps duties.
They appealed to his Philippine loyalties. He also had $500,000 in debts at the time. $200,000 in personal debt and $300,000 mortgage.
He was a naturalized US citizen born in the Philippines.
He was a retired US Marine Gunnery Sergeant with 21 years of service. Wife and two children.
At the time of his arrest he was an FBI intelligence analyst at Fort Monouth, NJ.
He admitted that he sought positions with the FBI, the CIA and NSA, to gain access to classified documents and information that would be useful to his co-conspirators.
Methodology:
He searched FBI computers for information, which was outside his work duties.
Downloaded documents from FBI computers onto disk, put disk in bag and took home.
ed classified documnts to contacts in Philippines.
15 foreign travels to the Philippines over 5 years.
He was arrested in Sep 2005.
He was sentenced May 4, 2006 to 10 years in prison and fined $40,000 for espionage and other charges for taking and transferring classified information.
He was never paid for his crimes. 11

12. ANA MONTES, GS-14, DIA, Senior Analyst
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Ideology, Divided loyalties
Indicator: Divided loyalties or allegiances. Strongly held beliefs contradictory to US policy. Statements or actions that demonstrates an individual believes that the rules do not apply to him or her.
ANA MONTES, GS-14, DIA, Senior Analyst
DIA's senior Cuban analyst
Disagreed with US Latin America policies
Recruited in 1985 by the Cubans
Felt that US government laws against Cuba were cruel and felt morally obligated to defend Cuba
Arrested Sep 01, convicted on conspiracy to commit espionage, sentenced to 25 years, plus 5 years probation
Remains completely unrepentant about her actions
For 16 years, the entire time she worked at DIA, she was a clandestine agent of the Cuban intelligence service.
In her remarks to the judge at her sentencing, she stated she decided to obey her conscience rather than the law.
Montes admitted that giving classified information to Cuba to defend itself was probably morally wrong and not justified. But that she did what she thought was right to counter a greater injustice.
As DIA's senior Cuban analyst, she was responsible for preparing the national intelligence assessments on Cuba.
She was recruited by Cuban intelligence in Puerto Rican by birth. Educated at John Hopkins. Motivated solely by her political beliefs. Took no money other than minor payment for travel expenses and a laptop computer. Three of her siblings work for the FBI, her mother worked for the US government and her father was an Army physician.
Cuban intelligence, its secret police, received virtually everything it needed to know about U.S. intelligence, including the names of three US agents as well as material classified as "Top Secret".
Montes was so intent on fulfilling her commitment to Castro that she refused promotion and other career advancement opportunities at the DIA in order to not lose access to classified information of particular interest to Cuban intelligence.
Montes was in many ways the perfect spy. With access to top secret intelligence agency day, she could provide the Castro regime with material of the greatest value. As an analyst responsible for providing information to be used by policy makers, she worked both ends of the operation. 12

13. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Clues to watch for:
Ego, Psychological Issues ~ proving oneself as smarter, better than others, creating a sense of self-worth.
Indicators: Deeply disturbed psychologically. Extreme risk taker, usually perceived by others as aloofness or arrogance. Significant financial difficulties. Inappropriate, unusual, or excessive interest in classified information (outside current assignment). Use of unauthorized software on government computers.
ROBERT HANSSEN, GS-14, FBI CI Officer
Volunteered to spy for KGB for 22 years, received more than $1.4 million in cash and diamonds
Arrested in 2001, pled guilty to 15 counts of espionage
Sporadic career as a spy (1979 – 81) (1985 – 91) (1999 – 2001)
Described as "possibly the worst intelligence disaster in US history"
Sentenced to life in solitary confinement at the Supermax Federal Penitentiary in Florence, CO
Robert Hanssen was born in Chicago, his father was a Chicago police officer. Initially he planned to become a dentist, but soon switched to business. But soon took a job with the Chicago Police Department Internal Affairs.
Married while in college, and converted to Catholicism. Became a member of Opus Dei, a radical branch of the Catholic church.
After two years with the Chicago PD, he joined the FBI in January 1976.
Worked most of his career in the National Security Division.
In his capacity as an investigator and manager, Hanssen had access to the most sensitive classified information about the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI and other agencies in the US Intelligence Community.
Only three years after joining the FBI he began his career spying for the Russians.
His initial motivation was "to get a little money" and then "get out of it". His initial payment was for $30,000. For this he identified known and suspected Soviet intelligence officers, to include the highest ranking military intelligence officer ever to spy for the West.
His wife became aware of his activities in She insisted he talk to a priest, who advised him to give the money to charity. He then cut off contact with the Soviets.
In 1985, he walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and disclosed the identities of several Russian double-agents. He continued his espionage activities on and off again until 1991, primarily to raise money.
In 1990, Hanssen's brother-in-law, Mark Wauck, who was also a FBI employee, reported his suspicious on Hanssen, when his sister-in-law discovered piles of cash sitting on the Hanssens' bedroom dresser in Five years before this, Hanssen's wife, Bonnie, had told him that they were planning to retire to Poland, which at that time was in the Eastern Bloc. Wauck knew the FBI was looking for a mole. He talked to his supervisor, who took no action.
The Soviet Union ceased to exist in December of Hanssen broke off communication and was out of contact for years.
In 1996, another FBI agent accused Hanssen of being a mole, because Hanssen had hacked into another agent's computer. No action was taken.
By late 1999, he was running up credit card debt, a mortgage on his house, some of his six children were in college; and "financial pressures" were creating an "atmosphere of desperation."
Hanssen led an apparently frugal life, using some of the money he received on home improvements and private schooling for his children. He also spent a significant sum on a stripper he was trying to reform.
In 2000, the FBI, who had been hunting for a mole since 1994, decided to change tactics and buy the mole's identity. A former KGB officer was located who had the actual intelligence file of the mole's communications. Which he sold to the FBI for seven million dollars and asylum. In the file was an audio tape, with Bob Hanssen's voice on it.
Hanssen was arrested on February 18, 2001 in the act of taking a sealed garbage bag of classified material and taping it to the bottom side of a wooden footbridge over a creek. He was arrested on the spot.
Over 22 years and more than forty passes of classified information, Hanssen turned over to the Soviets and Russian intelligence an estimated 26 diskettes and 6,000 pages of classified information.
Hanssen's only comment was, "What took you so long?"
He plea bargained a death penalty to life in prison without parole, and his wife was allowed to keep the survivor's portion of his pension, $38,000 a year.
In his final statement at his sentencing he showed no remorse for his actions.

14. RYAN G. ANDERSON, E-4, USA, M1 Tank Crewman
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Ideology: Support of Islamic extremism
Indicator: Divided loyalties or allegiances. Strongly held beliefs contradictory to US policy. Disloyalty toward the US. Association or sympathy with persons advocating acts of force or violence against the US Government.
RYAN G. ANDERSON, E-4, USA, M1 Tank Crewman
Born in the US in 1978, converted to Islam in 1998
Tank crewman with the 81st Armored Bde, Fort Lewis
Joined the Washington National Guard in 2002
Attempted to contact Muslim extremists using Internet chat rooms
Arrested Feb 2004, convicted in Sep 2004 on 5 charges of aiding the enemy, sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, demoted to E-1, dishonorable discharge
National Guardsman convicted of passing information on US troops and weapons to al-Qaida.
Arrested in Feb 2004, just weeks before he was to deploy to Iraq with the Washington National Guard 81st Armored Brigade, Fort Lewis, WA.
He converted to Islam in 1998 and began using the name 'Amir Abdul Rashid'.
Anderson attend Washington State University and studied Middle Eastern military history. He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 2002 and joined the Washington State National Guard the same year. He was married, no children.
Anderson attempted to contact Muslim extremists through Internet chat rooms that catered to jihadism. In a sting operation involving the Army, the FBI and the Department of Justice, he ended up communicating with undercover operatives. A Montana city judge who doubles as an Internet sleuth first discovered Anderson on a jihadist chat room and reported him to the FBI.
Anderson passed to a FBI undercover agent sketches of M1A1 and M1A2 tanks and a computer disk with his passport photo, military ID card, and military weapons card. Anderson was charged with: Attempting to provide intelligence to the enemy; Attempting to aid the enemy; and Discrediting the Armed Forces by providing military information to people he thought were terrorists.
"I wish to desert from the U.S. Army. I wish to defect from the United States. I wish to join al-Qaeda, train its members and conduct terrorist attacks."
Attempted to plead guilty by reason of insanity. However, was found guilty on all five charges against him. Demoted to E-1, received a Dishonorable Discharge, and sentenced to Life with the possibility of parole. 14

15. HASSAN Abu-JIHAAD, formerly Paul R. Hall, former USN
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Ideology: Support of Islamic extremism
Indicator: Extremist religious beliefs – Islamic extremism. An "above the rules" attitude. Unreported foreign contacts. Extreme level of bitterness, resentment, vengeance, or disgruntlement. Immaturity. Victim mentality. Willingness to violate the rights of others to achieve one's own ends.
HASSAN Abu-JIHAAD, formerly Paul R. Hall, former USN
Born in the US in 1976, Islamic convert in 1997
As a Navy signalman second class voluntarily spied for Al Qaeda/Islamic jihadists in
Exchanged s, praised attack on USS Cole, provided drawings of naval battle group, discussed upcoming missions, and recommended methods to attack the battle group
Arrested Mar 07, convicted Mar 08, sentenced to 10 years in federal prison.
Hassan Abu_Jihaad is another example of today's face of espionage as he SPIED FOR HIS IDEOLOGY.
Hassan Abu-Jihaad was a homegrown religious extremist who secretly contacted an al-Qaeda support cell in Great Britain and provided classified information while serving as a Seaman in the US Navy.
He began his career in espionage in the Spring of 2001, just six months after the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Yemen, which he described as a "martyrdom operation".
He was uncovered in December 2003, when British authorities, MI6, raided the apartment of a Briton, later charged with raising money for al Qaeda. MI6 discovered a floppy disk with a password-protected document detailing what was then classified information about the details of his battle group's movements and perceived vulnerability of the battle group to terrorist attacks.
Further investigations, uncovered a trail of messages expressing support for Osama bin Laden, praise of the Cole attack, and orders for various jihadist videos and other materials.
Described as mild-mannered, polite and unobtrusive. He converted to Islam in 1997, changing his name. He chose a surname that means "father of holy war".
He entered the Navy in 1998, where he was stationed aboard the Navy destroyer USS Benfold. He left the Navy in 2002, with a better-than-average service record. He returned to UPS in Phoenix, where he worked before the Navy.
He married in 2000, and had two children over the next two years. He and his wife divorced in 2005 and he retained custody of both of his children.
After his divorce, Abu-Jihaad roomed with an individual, who later pled guilty to plotting an attack on a suburban mall using hand grenades during the 2006 Christmas season. On wiretaps Abu-Jihaad was overheard discussing plans to attack military recruiting office in Phoenix and in Sand Diego; and the purchase two AR-15s.
He was arrested in March 07, and convicted in a federal court a year later on all charges of espionage and providing material support to terrorism. He is facing 25 years in federal prison. His sentencing is scheduled for late May 2008. 15

16. CYBER CI
What is it?
Cyber Counterintelligence is using highly technical tools and procedures to identify, deter, and/or exploit external and internal threats to US personnel, resources, or equipment.
An external threat – a foreign intelligence or extremist penetration.
An internal threat – a trusted insider threat – someone who uses a Government computer network or resources to commit espionage, treason, sedition or perform extremist/terrorist actions against Army personnel, facilities, or equipment. 16

17. CYBER CI
What Methods may a Hostile Intelligence Service may try to use against you ?
Spam Caution: "Put your TSP plan in overdrive"
Most Popular? Targeted or “SPAM” , containing malicious software or a link to a site hosting malicious code.
These s may be targeted to a specific person or Senior Leader (Spear phishing), or…
The s may be a general “phishing” attempt to get as many Army network users as possible to click the link, or access the malicious code. 17

18. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY
What Methods may a Hostile Intelligence Service may try to use against you ?
Criminal: Bank and credit card account numbers, usernames, passwords…
Foreign Intelligence Service: CAC credentials; AKO usernames and passwords; social networking usernames and passwords.
Social networking: Is there anything on your Facebook or MySpace page which could be of interest to Foreign Intel? Anything compromising?
The Invasion of The Chinese Cyberspies “TITAN RAIN” 18

19. Cyber Reportable Incidents
What do I report?
Known or suspected contact with a foreign government or extremist element.
Gaining access to information or systems without a need-to-know.
Accelerating Privileges (attempts to gain Admin).
Disregard for computer security and handling/processing of classified information.
Known or suspected contact with a foreign government or extremist elements.
Gaining access to information or systems without a need-to-know.
Accelerating Privileges (attempts to gain Admin).
Disregard for computer security and handling/processing of classified information. 19

20. Cyber trends Things to consider…
Illegal activity involving computers will continue to dramatically increase as the technology advances.
The Internet offers foreign intelligence operatives, terrorists, and other criminal elements a method to communicate which is secure, global, anonymous and near instant.
Terrorists are using the Internet for operations, propaganda, fundraising, recruitment, data mining, & coordination. 20

21. Terrorism 21

22. DEFINITIONS
The use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of established criminal laws for the purposes of intimidation, coercion or ransom
Promote or raise the level of fear in
the populace
Demonstrate the governments inability
to provide for the security of it’s
citizens.
Publicity for their cause. 22

23. DISTINCTIONS
DOMESTIC TERRORISM: Involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: Groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States or whose activities transcend national boundaries
Insider Threat: Employees who sympathize with causes and ideologies contrary to U.S. policy for political, religious or other reasons and act or plan to act on their convictions.
Timothy McVeigh, and the Oklahoma City Bombing, 19 April 1995
25 June 1996
Khobar Towers Bombing
Saudi Arabia 23

24. THREAT INFORMATION - GERMANY
The “Sauerland Group”
All German Nationals
Two converts to Islam
Radicalized in German Mosques
and on the Internet
All trained in Pakistan
Target: Any location in Germany to
“kill as many Americans as
possible”
- Discos
- U.S. Installations
- Sporting Events
What in the 1970s and 1980 was the threat from the communist inspired Red Army Faction (RAF) fighting against the great capitalist enemy, the United States, has been replaced by the ideologues of Islam who oppose U.S. policy as the great Satan. The Sauerland Group is the most recent iteration of homegrown, foreign trained and ideologically motivated terrorists. Their arrest was only the tip of sympathizers radicalized in Mosques. At least nine others have been identified as supporters and direct sympathizers with this group. The four men on this slide have confessed to their conspiracy and provided details of their actions – they are however, unrepentant. 24

25. Political Influence – Spain/Germany
The conservative government supporting
U.S. policy loses the election
- Not just the because of lack of public support
- 11 Mar 2004 – two-hundred people killed in an attack on commuter trains.
Germany 2009:
Al-Qaida media campaign against the ruling conservative government
- Attacks are threatened but fail to materialize
- Strong German/U.S. cooperation may have deterred plots.
- BUT – the pressure remains as does the threat. 25

26. Ryan Anderson SPC, US Army NG
Attacks are carefully planned:
Collecting Information
From People
From the Internet
From GPS
Collaboration by willing assistants
Surveillance
The best time to catch them in the act 26

27. Protective Measures Awareness is the key!
Know the neighbors and any vehicles routinely parked near your home/office
Know what is common in your workplace. What is out of place?
Attend any available Force Protection Training with your family
Observe your environment – clothing? mannerisms? Blend in as best you can!
Make mental note of suspicious or out-of-place individuals, items or incidents 27

28. Insider Threats and Indicators
Advocating violence, the threat of violence, or use of force to achieve political, religious or ideological goals
Advocating support for international terrorist organizations or objectives
Providing financial or other material support to terrorist organizations or individuals suspected of being terrorists
Association with or connections to known or suspected terrorists
Familial ties to known or suspected international terrorists or terrorist supporters
The insider threat focuses on the employee who may be disgruntled and unhappy with his job relationship, but beyond that also takes on added anti-US ideas and sympathies. Based on the shooting at Fort Hood, indicators were developed to help identify those people who may not just be unhappy with their job, but ready to take violent action against their fellow soldiers and army peers. 28

29. Insider Threats and Indicators
Repeated expressions of hatred and intolerance of American society, culture, government or principles of the U.S. constitution.
Repeated browsing or visiting internet websites promoting or advocating violence directed against the U.S. or U.S. Force, or promoting international terrorism or terrorist themes without official sanction in the performance of duties.
Expressing an obligation to engage in violence in support of international terrorism or inciting others to do the same.
Purchasing bomb making materials or obtaining information about the construction of explosives.
Active attempts to encourage others to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities.
Most people don’t start their jobs hating them and in most cases, even if one dislikes their job, the discontent is either managed or the person moves on. Those who chose to remain and fester on their real or imagined grievances may also express their opinions about their employers and the reasons for their discontent. Care must be taken to distinguish between legitimate gripes and passing complaints in comparison to long term, on-going disillusionment, opposition to, or hatred of the job, the co-workers or the institution.
As the internet takes on ever greater importance in daily interactions, so to the use of the internet by terrorists, their sympathizers and supporters is gaining momentum. Forums, both public and private, discuss the flaws in U.S. policy and suggest a host of actions against the U.S. from lawful disobedience to violent acts against U.S. interests and U.S. persons. The armed forces are a ready and visible target with daily news reports featuring military developments and focused on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the greater middle east policies.
Those who oppose U.S. policy and action are as active on the internet as major corporations and post blogs, forums and discussion groups where they spread their ideology and hatred influencing people on a global scale. They may also provide the means to take action by providing plans and tactics on how to build and then use explosive devices or take armed action against people and facilities. 29

30. DO NOT: REPORTING AN INCIDENT WHAT YOU SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT DO!
Try to investigate the incident
on your own!
Commit yourself to anything!
Discuss the incident or your
suspicions with anyone except
US Army Intelligence
Special Agents!
DON’Ts

31. DO: REPORTING AN INCIDENT WHAT YOU SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT DO!
Be observant & attentive!
Remember details about
people, places, conversations,
and vehicles ~ including
license plate numbers!
DO’s
Be aware of the indicators of
espionage; if in doubt, report!
Report the incident ONLY to US
Army Intelligence Special Agents

32. Do not go into any details on the phone
Do not go into any details on the phone. Simply provide your contact information.

33. QUESTIONS? CALL US! REMEMBER Espionage is a serious
National security crime
It can have far reaching
and deadly implications
If you encounter a
suspicious situation ~
Don’t take a chance
CALL US!

34. Federal Espionage Laws
Codified in Title 18 Section 793 and 794 US Code
1917 Espionage Law
Terrorist attack of 1916 on Black Tom Island, NJ
1917 11
Crime of Espionage
Unauthorized transmittal
of national defense information
to a foreign power or agent
with the intent to harm the US or aid that foreign power
The federal Espionage Laws along with other related crimes date back to a terrorist attack of 1916 on Black Tom Island, NJ.
The Black Tom explosion of July 30, 1916 in Jersey City was an act of sabotage on American ammunition supplies by German intelligence agents.
This event was possibly the worst act of terrorism on American soil, until the World Trade Center attack, eighty-five years later.
Black Tom was a major munitions depot supplying the Allied war effort during WWI. The night of attack, two million pounds of ammunition was stored at the depot in freight cars, including one-hundred thousand pounds of TNT, all awaiting shipment to Britain and France.
German agents set a series of small fires on the pier.
At 2:08 am the first explosion took place. Windows were broken 25 miles away from the force of the explosion. Property damage was estimated at nearly $400 million (in today's dollars).
This event had such an impact that proposals were made to court martial civilians, since there were no viable laws to deal with espionage at the time.
The result was the 1917 Espionage Law.
There was a period in America's history that we did not prosecute spies, mostly because we did not have the laws or the political will to do so.
To illustrate this, from 1967 to 1974, there were no federal prosecutions for espionage and only ten individuals were convicted in military courts for espionage-related activity.
The FBI didn't begin to train their agents in counterintelligence until 1973, and it wasn't until the early 1980's that FBI agents received training in counter-espionage.
Since 1945 to date, there have been 251 individuals arrested in the US for espionage or espionage related crimes.
Since the end of the Cold War, 1989, 78 individuals have been arrested for espionage or espionage-related crimes.
Since 1945 to early-2008, there have been 251 individuals arrested
in the US for espionage or espionage related crimes. 34

35. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Clues to watch for: Unreported or Concealed Contacts with Foreign Nationals
Indicator: Unreported personal contacts with foreign intelligence services, foreign governments, close continuing contact with foreign nationals, unreported relatives or associates. Contact with a foreign embassy, or consulates.
Albert T. Sombolay, SPC, US Army
Assigned to the 8th INF Div in during Desert Shield
Contacted Iraqi, Libyan & Jordanian embassaries ~ volunteered to support the "Arab cause"
passed NBC equipment and US troop readiness information
Arrested Mar 91, convicted of espionage in Jul 91
Sentenced to 34 years at hard labor

36. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Clues to watch for: Finances
Indicator: Unexplained sudden affluence. Living/spending beyond one's apparent means. Unexplained or sudden large sums of cash. Sudden windfalls. Claims of significant independent income from inheritance, wealthily relatives, gifts, investments, family business. Personnel possessions inconsistent with salary.
James Hall, WO1, US Army
While assigned to Berlin, sold classified information to East Germany for over $300,000
"I wasn't terrible short of money. I just decided I didn't ever want to worry where my next dollar was coming from."
Arrested in Dec 88 in Savannah, GA.
Sentenced to 40 years in prison, $50,000 fine, dishonorable discharge.

37. BRIAN P. REGAN, MSGT (Ret), USAF
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Finances
Indicator: Has a sudden reversal of a bad financial situation. Suddenly repays large debts or loans. Free spending or lavish display of wealth that appears beyond normal income.
BRIAN P. REGAN, MSGT (Ret), USAF
US National Reconnaissance Office employee with $117,000 in credit card debt
See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.
Volunteered to spy for Iraq, China and Libya. Wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein
Offered to sell classified information for $13M
Arrested in Aug 01, sentenced to life in prison without parole

38. CLYDE LEE CONRAD, SFC (Ret), US Army
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Leave and Travel
Indicator: Any unreported frequent personal foreign travel. Trips with costs out of proportion to short time spent at the location. Recurring trips not associated with recreation or family. Repeated short leaves.
CLYDE LEE CONRAD, SFC (Ret), US Army
Sold US and NATO classified information, including NATO Defense Plans, to Hungarians and Czechoslovakians. One of the most damaging spies in US Army history.
Repeated traveled to Vienna, AU and other countries to meet his case officers.
Recruited 10 others
Bi-lateral USAI and German Intel investigation led to his arrest in Aug 1988
See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.

39. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Clues to watch for:
Attempts to obtain witness signatures on classified document or crypto destruction forms when the witness did not observe the destruction
JOHN WALKER JR.
USN, LTCdr (Ret)
Spied for Russian KGB from 1967 until One of the most damaging spy rings in US History
Arthur James Walker
Michael Lance Walker
Jerry Alfred Whitworth
Forged destruction records for highly sensitive US Navy cryptographic codes. Secretly provided the codes to the KGB allowing Russia to decipher US classified messages for many years
KGB comment: "Walker was the greatest case in KGB history. We deciphered millions of your messages. If there had been a war, we would have won it"
See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.
Convinced his brother, his son and his friend, to spy for him
Its cost the US taxpayer an estimated one billion dollars to repair the damage the "Walker Spy Ring" had done
Ex-wife turned him in to FBI. All received a life sentence except for Michael Walker who received a 25 year sentence

40. ESPIONAGE INDICATORS Clues to watch for:
Brings unauthorized cameras, recording devices, hand-held scanners or laptop computers into areas where classified materials are maintained
Assigned to Augsburg, Germany, as a Signals Analyst from 1988 to In 1988, he walked into a Russian embassy and volunteered to be a spy
DAVID S. BOONE
USA, SFC
Motivated by money. Russian payments totaled more than $60,000 in three years
Used a hand held scanner to copy Top Secret documents
BOONE
A former Army signals analyst for the National Security Agency, was arrested 10 October and charged with selling Top Secret documents to agents of the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991, including a 600-page manual describing US reconnaissance programs and a listing of nuclear targets in Russia. Boone was arrested at a suburban Virginia hotel after being lured from his home in Germany to the United States in a FBI sting operation. He had worked for the NSA for three years before being reassigned to Augsburg, Germany, in 1988, and retired from the Army in In October 1988, the same month that he separated from his wife and children, Boone walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and offered his services. According to a FBI counterintelligence agent’s affidavit, Boone was under “severe financial and personal difficulties” when he began spying. His former wife had garnished his Army sergeant’s pay, leaving him with only $250 a month. According to the federal complaint, Boone met with his handler about four times a year from late 1988 until June 1990, when his access to classified information was suspended because of “his lack of personal and professional responsibility." He held a Top Secret clearance from 1971 and gained access to SCI information in He is alleged to have received payments totaling more than $60,000 from the KGB. Boone was indicted on three counts: one for conspiracy to commit espionage and the other two related to his alleged passing of two Top Secret documents to his Soviet handler. On 18 December, Boon pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and on 26 February 1999 he was sentenced to 24 years and four months in prison. Under a plea agreement Boone was also required to forfeit $52,000 and a hand-held scanner he used to copy documents.
See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.
Compromised a 600 page manual describing US reconnaissance programs and a listing of nuclear targets in Russia
Lured to the United States in an FBI sting operation and arrested. In February 1999, sentenced to 24 years and four months in prison, and a $52,000 fine

41. Makes jokes or brags about spying
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Makes jokes or brags about spying
Harold Nicholson
CIA Officer
Seen here sporting a "KGB is for me" shirt, he spied for the Russians from Jun 1994 until his arrest in Nov Russian payments totaled $120,000
Compromised the identities of every CIA officer trained in that period
"Hacked" into the CIA computer database and stole any classified information he could access
See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.
Was arrested at an Airport while he was about to board a flight to Switzerland. He was carrying roles of film containing Top Secret Information
In Jun 1997 was sentenced to 23 years in prison without parole

42. USN, Civilian Intelligence Analyst
ESPIONAGE INDICATORS
Clues to watch for:
Extensively uses copiers, fax devices, or computer printers to reproduce or transmit sensitive material
Boasted about working for the Israeli Mossad Intelligence Service as early as 1976
JONATHAN J. POLLARD
USN, Civilian Intelligence Analyst
Was initially motivated by religious beliefs but later was clouded by monetary considerations
Coworkers notified authorities after observing him extensively using the copy machine to reproduce classified documents
See ESPIONAGE DOCUMENTS Folder on the CD for more information.
Had a suitcase stuffed with documents classified up to Top Secret in his home
Pollard and his wife, Anne, were arrested on 21 Nov 1985 while trying to seek asylum at the Israeli Embassy in D.C.
Sentenced to Life in Prison without Parole

43. “THERE IS NO HONOR AMONGST THIEVES”
FACT: In nearly every espionage case, the spy was tasked to report any incriminating or embarrassing information on their coworkers and to assess them for possible recruitment
Stress two points:
Spies have no friends. They do not deserve loyalty. If somebody suspects a coworker of espionage, it is not “snitching’, rather it could be a matter of their own life and death.
Even if a spy has the greatest security (shows no indicators) they can still be revealed by a Defector. Sooner or later, they will be uncovered.
FACT: In nearly every military espionage case, the spy sold information which could have killed their fellow soldiers or colleagues in time of war
FACT: Several Intelligence Officers of adversary services have defected to the U.S. in recent history. Each revealed the identities of their spies in return for American asylum

44. The assessment - WEAKNESSES a FIS Officer would look for
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY
The assessment - WEAKNESSES
a FIS Officer would look for
Ideology and
religious beliefs
Markus Wolf was the director
of the former East German
Intelligence Service
and hailed as one of the best
spy-masters of the Cold War.
"There were cases where
interesting target people said,
"No. That's it -- period.
In such a case, there's nothing
you can do." "I tried lure them… I made financial
offers… tried to get them to carry on…, but we
failed and there was nothing we could do…"
Ego problem or
adventure seeker
Disgruntlement and/or
seeking revenge
Espionage, for the most part, involves finding a person who knows something or has something that you can induce them secretly to give to you. That always involves a betrayal of trust.
Espionage revolves around the many different forms of betrayals of trust – Here is a list of weaknesses/ factors
Since 1990, American spies have been poorly paid. 81% were not paid since 1990.
Reason is, since 1990 more spies have acted from divided localities and have refused payment.
Personal, financial
or professional
problems
Substance Abuse
Loneliness and/or
sex