1. Ian Apperly University of Birmingham
What is belief reasoning? (And why do researchers from the “theory of mind” and social cognition traditions find it so hard to talk to each other?)
Ian Apperly
University of Birmingham

2. Collaborators Funding Dana Samson Elisa Back Jason Braithwaite
Dan Carroll
Glyn Humphreys
Kevin Riggs
Andrew Simpson
Funding
British Academy
Leverhulme Trust
ESRC
MRC

3. Overview
Background
Recent behavioural data on theory of mind in adults
Observations, problems and questions about the link between theory of mind and social cognition

4. What is “Theory of Mind”?
Folk psychology, mentalising, social cognition
False belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
Ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

5. Background on ToM We know a lot about development
We know something about the cognitive and neural basis in adults
Yet we know almost nothing about the basic operating characteristics of theory of mind processes
What kinds of mental representations?
Specialised versus generic functional and neural processes?
Automatic versus controlled processing?
What role in on-going cognitive activity (social cognition, communication)?

6. Why is it important to study ToM in adults?
Neuroscience research
Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ TP
Medial view
mPFC

7. ToM (or “mentalizing”, or “perspective-taking”, “mind reading” etc……
ToM (or “mentalizing”, or “perspective-taking”, “mind reading” etc…….) is not a unitary ability

8. ToM inferences
Sometimes we must infer mental states

9. Non-inferential “holding in mind”
Sometimes we are told what someone thinks
(and should not confuse this with what we know)
All George needs is the guiding hand of a trusted friend

10. You was caned? Respect man, respect
ToM Use
e.g., Interpreting what people say in terms of what they know
Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate?
Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life
You was caned? Respect man, respect

11. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

12. Are ToM inferences automatic?
Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci.
Rationale:
In a situation where there is no particular reason to make ToM inferences, will the inferences nonetheless be made?

13. Are ToM inferences Automatic?
Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci.
Condition 1: Monitor Reality
Is belief monitored too?
Condition 2: Track Reality and Belief
Condition 3: Track Belief

14. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
ToM inferences are not automatic: They require cognitive control
But this may not always be true

15. Automatic perspective taking
Automatic perspective taking? (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite & Andrews, submitted)
1,2, or 3 discs
Self / Other Consistent
You / He 2
Disc position varies
Self / Other Inconsistent
You / He 2

16. Automatic perspective taking?
Egocentric interference
RT (ms)
Main effect of consistency
Significant interaction

17. Automatic perspective taking?
Altercentric interference
RT (ms)
Main effect of consistency
Significant interaction

18. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control

19. Non-inferential ToM: The cost of holding false beliefs in mind
Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.
Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks
Measure difficulty of making judgements about this information

20. Non-inferential ToM: The cost of holding false beliefs in mind
Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.
Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks
Measure difficulty of making judgements about this
False belief + reality
Unrelated
belief + reality

21. Non-inferential ToM: The cost of holding false beliefs in mind
Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.
Processing Efficiency (RT/Proportion Correct) * ~

22. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control
To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)

23. ToM Use Rationale Very easy ToM inference
Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission).
Rationale
Very easy ToM inference
Can this inference be used to guide interpretation of speech?
E.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr (2003)

24. Instructor: Experimental

25. Instructor: Control

26. No-instructor: Experimental

27. ToM Use Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission).
Average number of errors

28. Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes
ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control
To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)
Using ToM information can be a difficult task-set to maintain

29. Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM
Neuroscience research
Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
What do they do?
ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ TP
Medial view
mPFC

30. ToM processing model: (after Leslie, 1992, 2005)
Observed Behaviour
ToMM SP
Modular: Fast, automatic, domain-specific….
“Executive selection”: Slow? Controlled? Domain-General?

31. (after Shallice & Burgess, 1996)

32. Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM
ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment
Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising”
Neuroscience research
Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ TP
Medial view
mPFC

33. Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM
ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment
Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising”
Important role for cognitive control processes
Understanding ToM will require more than understanding the functional and neural basis of ToM-specific processes
Some of the “social network” may be concerned with control processes
Some processes critical for ToM are almost certainly subtracted out in existing analyses
Caution when interpreting meta-analyses of imaging data
Neuroscience research
Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
A good design for identifying tom-specific neural regions may be a bad design for understanding whether executive processes are necessary for ToM
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ TP
Medial view
mPFC

34. The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions
“Beliefs” in the ToM tradition are usually transitory states closely linked to epistemic access
But enduring beliefs surely play a similar causal role in explaining and predicting behaviour
“Transitory versus enduring” is an important dimension
I’m not sure if it can discriminate different kinds of mental states in a clear way

35. The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions
The ToM tradition studies beliefs as the causal consequences of epistemic access. Any rational, sentient agent will have such beliefs.
Contrast with social cognition tradition which tends to see beliefs as characteristics of the target - the “kind of person” they are
Target characteristics are irrelevant for typical ToM problems
Self-other similarity is irrelevant to these typical ToM problems
Is it nonetheless an influence?

36. The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions
Self-reflection and projection (or egocentric anchoring and adjustment) are possible but not necessary processes in ToM reasoning
We can make ToM judgements even when we don’t have to infer hidden mental states, when we don’t know reality and when we don’t care about the content of the mental state

37. Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM
Clever new methods
+ Careful task analysis
= plenty of interesting work
Neuroscience research
Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)
What do they do?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
A good design for identifying tom-specific neural regions may be a bad design for understanding whether executive processes are necessary for ToM
Medial prefrontal cortex
Lateral view
TPJ TP
Medial view
mPFC

45. Functional and neural processes specific to ToM?
Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls
Very short stories
False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies
Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM stimuli?

46. Functional and neural processes specific to ToM?
Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls
Very short stories
False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies
Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM-related stimuli?
Responds selectively for thinking about beliefs, desires, intentions
Not for people’s appearance or background social information, (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005)
or non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006)
Responds selectively for thinking about false beliefs and non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006)
Left hemisphere
L-TPJ
R-TPJ
Right hemisphere

47. So what have we found? Perspective-taking in left-TPJ?
(Perner et al. 2006)
ToM is specific to right-TPJ and is independent of processes for inhibition and cognitive control?
(e.g., Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004)
We can accept that these findings are informative, but still think that other processes are equally interesting and equally necessary for ToM