1. Fisheries Management Performance and the Ecosystem Challenge
Jon G. Sutinen
Mark Soboil
University of Rhode Island
USA

2. Three take-home messages
Rights-based management works well
superior conservation & economic benefits
outperforms traditional management
Resist the alliance of short-term interests
fundamental source of failure
reforms are needed
Plan carefully your EBFM approach

3. The OECD Study
OECD Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Economic Aspects of the Management of Living Marine Resources. Paris
Assembled evidence and expert analysis from
24 OECD Member countries
more than 100 fisheries
4 years to complete

4. Evidence Management histories for each fishery
a chronological description of the management measures applied, and
corresponding outcomes observed in the fishery
biological
economic
social
administrative

5. Management Measures Output Controls Input Controls Technical Measures
Competitive Total Allowable Catch (42 cases)
Individual Quotas (55)
Vessel Catch Limits (19)
Input Controls
Limited Licenses (40)
Individual Effort Quotas (23)
Other Gear & Vessel Restrictions (45)
Technical Measures
Size & Sex Controls (49)
Time & Area Closures (52)

6. Consequences Biological Economic Social Administrative
exploitation status of resource stocks
Economic
net benefits
producers
processors
distributors
consumers
Social
perceived equity
life style
class divisions
Administrative
research
data quality
industry cooperation
enforcement

7. Competitive Total Allowable Catch (OECD 1997)
Race-to-fish
shortened seasons
market gluts
Over capacity
more & larger vessels
more HP, larger hull, etc.
Increased costs
harvesting and processing

8. Update on TACs Supports findings of OECD (1997)
race-to-fish
over capacity
Substantial reductions in TACs
Applied to new species
Japan
European Union

9. Limited Licenses OECD (1997)
Did not control fishing capacity
Did not stem over-exploitation
Increased harvesting costs
Some initial allocation problems

10. Time & Area Closures OECD (1997) Update
Closures not effective in assuring conservation
though evidence was weak
Update
Several new & enlarged closures
e.g., Mediterranean bluefin tuna
U.S. closures on Georges Bank & Gulf of Maine
improved abundance of sea scallops
recovery of yellowtail flounder

11. Size & Sex restrictions OECD (1997)
Do not mitigate the race-to-fish
Increased enforcement costs and/or problems
Some evidence that
the average size of fish landed increases
discards increase

12. Individual Fishing Quotas OECD (1997)
IFQs
potent & valuable tool
controlling exploitation,
mitigating the race-to-fish
generating sustainable economic benefits
reducing the number of participants in a fishery
serious side effects
initial allocation of quota
economic and social disruption (real & imagined)
enforcement and compliance.

13. Individual Fishing Quotas OECD (1997)
IFQ management
more conservation and economic benefits than other management measures
more social & administrative problems than other measures
non-IFQ management measures
far less conservation & economic benefits than IFQs
fewer social and administrative difficulties than IFQs

14. Why do IFQs perform so well?
IFQs are ‘rights-based’
provide fishing rights that are exclusive
exclusive rights of use mitigate
race-to-fish
user conflicts
excess capacity
provide a claim on the future
a willingness to sacrifice to conserve stocks

15. Update on IFQs Results supported by NRC(1999) study Worldwide trends
towards the use of IFQs
especially in fisheries formerly under competitive TAC management
towards cost recovery
user fees
users pay in proportion to benefits received

16. Update on IFQs Worldwide trends Solutions are being found
initial allocation
enforcement
equity & disruptions
Collective rights (U.S., Canada)
Community Development Quotas
Conservation Cooperatives
Community-based organizations

17. Status of world fisheries
Over exploited
28%
Fully exploited
47%
Grade: C-
Under exploited
25%
Source: Garcia, 2001

18. Status of world fisheries
Excess fishing capacity
Product waste
Low incomes & tax revenues
User conflicts
Etc.
Grade: F

19. Why this poor record? Why don’t we have a better record of management?
Why haven’t managers chosen more effective management methods?
rights-based measures
meaningful user participation
Do we lack the knowledge?
Do we lack the funds?

20. Possible Reasons FAO Governance Incentives Uncertainty
status & dynamics of fishery resource stocks
Poorly defined objectives
Institutional weaknesses
Short-term social & economic needs
vs. long-term sustainability
Governance Incentives

21. Fisheries Governance System
Legislature
Executive Branch Fisheries Agency
Fisheries Management
Authority
Stakeholders
Fishermen, Communities, Environmentalists

22. Fisheries Governance System
Legislature
Executive Branch Fisheries Agency
Fisheries Management
Authority
Stakeholders
Fishermen, Communities, Environmentalists

23. Fisheries Governance System
Legislature
Executive Branch Fisheries Agency
Fisheries Management
Authority
Stakeholders
Fishermen, Communities, Environmentalists
Multiply by
– user groups
– gear types
– locations
– agencies
– jurisdictions
Governance is a complex system or network of organisms
the ‘ecology of governance’

24. Causes of governance failure
Alliance of short-term interests
fishing industry
dominant stakeholders
without secure fishing rights
resist short-term sacrifice
no assurance of long-term benefits
elected officials
short-term election cycles (2, 4, 6, years)
concerned with short-term consequences
responsive to special interests

25. Question
Will governance & management institutions perform better under ecosystem-based management?

26. Ecosystem-based fisheries management
Increases the complexity of governance system
greater number & diversity of competing users
more demands on interagency collaboration & coordination
Will EBFM increase or decrease
the chances of failure?
Plan carefully
governance incentives must be properly aligned
balance long-term and short-term interests

27. Conclusions Fishery governance systems Reforms are needed
biased against conservation of resources
Reforms are needed
to block the causes of governance failure
alliance of short-term interests
to adhere to first principles of
effective fisheries management
rights-based methods
good government

28. Reforms Devolution Role of government resource users should
share the rights & responsibilities of management
bear full consequences of decisions
Role of government
oversight of management
not operational decision-making

29. Reforms Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishery Policy Making
abstain from political interference
in operational decision-making
i.e., insulate managers
set objectively measurable long-term objectives
exercise firm oversight of long-term performance